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Major Professor: Randall P. Ellis, PhD., Professor of Economics
ABSTRACT
This dissertation is composed of three essays studying agents’ behavior in the health
care sector - insurers, patients, and providers - facing different regulatory settings.
The first essay studies how vertical integration between pharmacies and insurers
affects Medicare Part D premiums. I propose a model of insurer-pharmacy bargaining,
which suggests that exposure to a vertically integrated firm should increase other
insurers’ premiums while lowering the integrated insurer’s. I test this using plan-level
data from 2006 to 2017, exploiting CVS’s acquisition of Target pharmacies. Exposure
to this integration increases non-CVS premiums as expected; however, CVS premiums
are unchanged. I estimate a demand model of plan choice to show that consumers
value a large network and having CVS pharmacies in their plan’s network.
The second essay (joint with Randall P. Ellis and Wenjia Zhu), estimates within-
year price elasticities of demand for detailed health care services. We use an instru-
mental variable strategy, in which individual monthly cost shares are instrumented
by employer-year-plan-month average cost shares. We show that using backward my-
opic prices gives more plausible results than using forward myopia. Using 171 million
person-months from 73 employers between 2008-2014, we estimate an overall demand
elasticity by backward myopic consumers of -0.44, with high demand elasticities for
pharmaceuticals, specialists visits, MRIs and mental health/substance abuse, and
vi
lower for prevention and emergency departments.
The third essay (joint with Luis Filipe), evaluates how doctors in an emergency
department react to the number of patients waiting for treatment. Our outcomes
reflect the time spent with the patient, the intensity of treatment and discharge des-
tination. Using visit-level data in one Lisbon-area hospital, we use a fixed effects
model to exploit variation in the queue size, while addressing endogeneity using the
number of arrivals to the hospital as an instrumental variable. Results show that doc-
tors discharge patients more rapidly as queues increase, and this effect is stronger for
patients that do not have life-threatening conditions. We also find that the intensity
of diagnosis/treatment procedures decrease when patients face longer queues, driven
by the extensive margin. Finally, doctors are less likely to admit patients to inpatient
care.
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1Chapter 1
Vertical Integration in Medicare Part D
1.1 Introduction
Vertical integration changes the interaction between competitors and potentially leads
to a different market equilibrium. The welfare impacts of vertical integration are am-
biguous, and ultimately an empirical question. Nevertheless, the empirical literature
on this topic is scarce.
Medicare Part D, the federal program that subsidizes prescription drug insurance
for the elderly and disabled, provides an interesting and important market that can
be used to analyze different effects from vertical integration. In March 2007, CVS
Corporation and Caremark Rx, Inc. merged into what became CVS/Caremark Cor-
poration (henceforth CVS), leading to the first vertically integrated firm, offering
both prescription drug insurance plans and owning pharmacies where enrollees fill
their prescriptions.
Economic theory predicts ambiguous welfare effects from vertical integration. On
the positive side, it predicts that vertical integration solves the double marginaliza-
tion problem. Vertical integration avoids a downstream firm (insurance company)
charging a mark-up on top of the upstream firm’s (pharmacy) mark-up. Moreover,
the integration between two firms might lead to efficiency gains that allow firms to
decrease their prices. However, negative effects can also happen. Of particular in-
terest is the possibility of (partial) market foreclosure. The integrated firm has an
incentive to charge higher access fees to its competitors (to be allowed to supply the
2market) than an upstream firm would if there was no integration.
This paper studies how vertical integration affects supply and demand in the
Medicare Part D market. On the supply side, I study the extent to which vertical
integration leads to market foreclosure. Pharmacies and insurers negotiate dispensing
fees, which correspond to the pharmacy reimbursement over the cost of acquiring the
drug. This dispensing fee is the profit margin for the pharmacy to cover fixed costs of
operation, and, at the same time, part of the insurer’s marginal cost. CVS pharmacies
have an incentive to bargain higher dispensing fees with health insurers in order to
increase their costs. Therefore, premiums that other insurers charge their enrollees
increase because of vertical integration. On the demand side, I analyze how consumers
value vertical integration in their insurance plan choice. In particular, I separately
assess how consumers value having CVS pharmacies in their plan’s network, and
whether they draw benefits from having a plan that is integrated with pharmacies.
A theoretical model where insurers and pharmacies bargain over dispensing fees
shows how market foreclosure affects premiums. The model’s main implication is
that as the probability of filling a prescription at a CVS pharmacy increases, which
I call exposure to CVS pharmacies, premiums decrease for CVS plans, but increase
for plans belonging to other firms. When exposure increases, CVS avoids paying the
dispensing fee to other pharmacies, and avoids the double marginalization problem.
However, for other insurers, exposure to CVS pharmacies increases dispensing fee
payments, as CVS charges more than other pharmacies, and therefore their costs
increase. The increasing payments come from the fact that CVS takes into account
that increasing dispensing fees positively impacts its profits in the insurance market.
I construct an empirical measure of health insurance plan’s exposure to CVS
pharmacies – defined as the share of pharmacies in a plan’s network that are owned
by CVS – and evaluate the differential impact of exposure on plan premiums, for CVS
3plans and other firms. I control for several plan characteristics in order to capture
the effect of demand on prices. I also include plan fixed effects, which capture time-
invariant plan characteristics. Therefore, I exploit how variation in the exposure to
CVS pharmacies over time affects premiums.
To estimate the causal impact of exposure to CVS on plan premiums, I use the
acquisition of Target pharmacies by CVS in 2015 as a source of exogenous variation.
Based on the idea by Dafny et al. (2012), I construct as an instrument for exposure
the simulated change in the plan’s exposure to CVS pharmacies due to the acquisition
of Target pharmacies. The hypothesis behind this instrument is that plans with more
Target pharmacies in their network will be more reactive to the acquisition than plans
with a small number of Target pharmacies. This acquisition increased the share of
CVS pharmacies in network by around 20%, and both CVS and other health insurers
exhibit a similar pre-acquisition trend in their exposure to CVS pharmacies.
I use insurance plan-level data between 2006 and 2017. Each plan is an insurance
policy that can only be sold in the region where it operates, and there is no overlapping
between regions. Typically, a region is a state, but some states are combined together.
Premiums are set annually, and so a market is a combination of a region-year.
Results show evidence of market foreclosure by CVS towards other health insurers.
The instrumental variable approach shows that insurers that are more exposed to
CVS pharmacies have higher premiums, but there is no evidence that same happens
to CVS plans. Indeed, a 1 percentage point increase in the share of CVS pharmacies
in network increases non-CVS insurers’ premiums by 3.7%. However, I cannot reject
that the share of CVS pharmacies in network has no impact on premiums for CVS
plans.
These results provide limited evidence that CVS is able to take advantage of
efficiency gains coming from integration. The impact of exposure on CVS premiums
4cannot be rejected from zero. If there were efficiency gains, CVS would have incentives
to decrease premiums. However, the increase in premiums for other firms due to
market foreclosure gives incentives for CVS to increase their own premiums. The fact
that the net effect is not distinguishable from zero implies that any efficiency gains
from integration are not enough to compensate for the strategic effect and improve
consumer welfare. Nevertheless, there is still scope for savings at the fixed cost level,
or marginal cost gains that do not translate into premium effects. To the extent that
pass-through in this market is small, my methodology is not able to find efficiency
gains.1
The lack of efficiency gains has been a concern in the health care mergers and
acquisitions literature. The consensus is that it’s very difficult to find good examples
of mergers that led to efficiency gains, as described by Dafny and Lee (2015). While
most papers focus on hospital analysis to look for efficiency gains (Gowrisankaran
et al. 2015, Schmitt 2017, Craig et al. 2018), Chorniy et al. (2018) look specifically
at the Medicare Part D market to infer efficiency gains from premium variation only
using a set of horizontal mergers and acquisitions that have happened since 2006.
They conclude that these mergers have not led to efficiency gains.
The results suggest that CVS has high leverage on negotiations with other phar-
macies to create its network. The fact that there is no statistically significant impact
between the share of CVS pharmacies in network and CVS premiums shows no ad-
vantage from switching enrollees between pharmacies. While doing so should allow
CVS to avoid paying dispensing fees, the results do not support such advantage. This
can happen because CVS is able to negotiate a low dispensing fee with other phar-
macies, so that there is no meaningful advantage to have their enrollees switching
to their own pharmacies. This hypothesis is particularly plausible when considering
1Duggan et al. (2016) show that for Medicare Advantage plans, one-eighth of any additional
reimbursement is passed onto consumers.
5that CVS is a large insurer, which allows them to have high leverage when negoti-
ating with pharmacies. Moreover, owning pharmacies also increases leverage, as the
outside option for CVS is higher.
Having established evidence of market foreclosure, a demand model allows me to
explore the reasons why insurers contract with CVS pharmacies, despite the negative
impact on their marginal costs. The benefit for the insurer from adding pharmacies in
a network comes from the expected increase in demand from selling a more attractive
plan to consumers. How attractive a plan is, as a function of its characteristics, is an
empirical question that can be answered using a demand model.
I create a demand model of plan choice that follows the standard approach in the
Medicare Part D literature (Lucarelli et al. 2012, Decarolis et al. 2015, Fleitas 2017)
to analyze three different factors that explain how network formation affects insurance
plan’s expected demand. The first factor is the overall size of the plan’s pharmacy
network. This factor is independent of the pharmacy ownership and explains how
consumers value having a larger set of options where to fill their prescriptions. The
benefit for a consumer from having a large network does not necessarily consist of
the opportunity from having many options too choose from, but rather from the
increased likelihood of having the most preferred pharmacy in the network. The
second factor is, for a given network size, the share of pharmacies that are owned by
CVS. Consumer’s utility may depend not only on the size of the network but also on
the distribution of their ownership. Therefore, I assess how consumers prefer a plan
that puts higher weight on pharmacies owned by CVS. Lastly, I interact the share
of pharmacies owned with an indicator for plans owned by CVS. This interaction
analyzes how consumer value more CVS pharmacies, but only to the extent that
the network belongs to a CVS plan. In other words, the interaction assesses how
consumers value the integration between plan and pharmacy.
6The demand model estimates show that consumers value a large plan network, and
there is weak evidence that they have preference over the distribution of pharmacies,
and integration between their plans and pharmacies. The network size has a positive
impact on consumer utility when choosing a prescription drug plan. The share of CVS
pharmacies in network has a positive, but noisy, coefficient on utility that cannot be
distinguished from zero. The same is true for the interaction between the share of
CVS and the CVS plan ownership indicator.
In light of the theoretical model, the demand results suggest that the insurers
contract with CVS pharmacies and pay higher dispensing fees for two reasons. First,
there is an increase in expected demand coming from the additional number of phar-
macies in network. The fact that CVS is the largest pharmacy chain in the U.S. gives
incentives for insurers to include them in their network, as having a substantially
smaller network would make their plans less competitive. Second, consumers have
a preference for CVS pharmacies. Because of this, including CVS pharmacies in a
network justifies having to charge higher premiums.
The economic details and implications of the Medicare Part D program has been
extensively studied in the literature. In particular, several papers have analyzed both
the demand and supply side and have proposed different counterfactuals regarding
prices, subsidies, firm ownership or plan design (Lucarelli et al. 2012, Decarolis 2015
or Fleitas 2017).
This paper adds to the body of literature that analyses the determinants of pre-
miums in Medicare Part D, by showing the impact of vertical integration. Insurance
firms have numerous strategies that affects premiums but cannot be captured by plan
characteristics, leading to the puzzle of what explains premium growth. According
to Ho et al. (2017), plan premiums increased by 62.8% between 2006 and 2009 alone.
Several theories have been suggested and tested. Duggan and Scott Morton (2010,
72011) test whether pharmaceutical drug price growth leads to increasing premiums
in Part D, but do not find such evidence. Another theory considers the fact that in-
ertia and sub-optimal plan choices are common (Kling et al. 2012, Heiss et al. 2013).
Ericson (2014) and Ho et al. (2017) show that insurers are able to exploit consumer
inertia to charge higher premiums. Decarolis (2015) shows how insurers gamble on
the low-income subsidy design to increase their premiums.
This paper is most similar to Starc and Swanson (2018), in the sense that I study
the effects of one non-monetary plan characteristic. I endogenize the choice of CVS
pharmacies to include in a plan’s network in a two-stage model where first, insurers
bargain with pharmacies to include them in the network, and second, insurers set
premiums. Starc and Swanson (2018) study how insurers use preferred pharmacy
networks to negotiate lower prices with pharmacies, and do not focus on the pharmacy
ownership. Moreover, their analysis is primarily of drug retail prices and demand for
pharmacies, while I focus on premiums and plan choice.
The effects of vertical integration in empirical health-care literature is scarce. In
particular, most studies focus on the effects of Hospital-Physician integration (Cilib-
erto and Dranove 2006, Huckman 2006, Baker et al. 2016, Koch et al. 2017, McCarthy
and Huang 2018). In this paper, I focus instead on the effects of vertical integration
between insurance companies and pharmacies.
I start by exposing the institutional details that regulate the Medicare Part D
market in Section 1.2, as well as an overall view of the mergers and acquisitions that
CVS has been involved in prior years. I present a theoretical model in Section 1.3 that
shows how to estimate market foreclosure without observing data on dispensing fees.
The empirical strategy, as well as identification, is discussed in Section 1.4. The data
sources and summary statistics are in Section 1.5 and the results for the reduced-form
pricing equation are in Section 1.6. I present the demand model and its estimates in
8Section 1.7. Finally, Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Institutional Context
The U.S. Medicare program provides health insurance nationally for individuals over
65 years old and individuals with disabilities. The program insures almost sixty mil-
lion individuals and, according to the Kaiser Family Foundation, constituted 17% of
total federal spending in 2017. Medicare is composed of four parts. Part A covers
hospital insurance (inpatient services) and Part B medical insurance (mainly outpa-
tient services). These two parts are the standard package that the usual Medicare
beneficiary receives. A beneficiary can buy a Part C plan, also called Medicare Ad-
vantage, in order to decrease their financial responsibilities. Moreover, Part C might
also provide additional benefits, such as vision, dental or prescription drugs. Finally,
Part D covers prescription drug insurance only.
Medicare Part D allows individuals to purchase prescription drug insurance plans
from approved private companies at a subsidized premium. This program is much
newer than the other Medicare parts. It was implemented as part of the Medicare
Modernization Act of 2003 and went into effect January 1, 2006. The Center for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services (CMS) regulates the program. The market is provided
by private insurers that offer plans that satisfy the minimum coverage requirements
regulated by the CMS.
Medicare Part D is generally considered a success. Duggan et al. (2008) give a
brief overview of the program challenges in its first three years. They conclude that,
despite the existence of areas for improvements, the program was successful in several
dimensions. Other studies have shown that Part D has been successful at lowering
out-of-pocket costs (Ketcham and Simon 2008, Ketcham et al. 2012, Engelhardt and
Gruber 2011).
9Insurance premiums for each plan are set once an year, for each of the 34 regions
that comprise the Part D market. Typically, a region is a state, but some smaller or
less populous states are combined into a single region. Insurers cannot sell the same
plan in two different markets, so each plan is market-specific. In order to be able to
sell a plan in a given calendar year, plans must submit a “bid” before the first Monday
of June of the previous year. This bid is what the insurer considers that they need to
receive in order to be willing to accept the Medicare beneficiary. CMS takes all the
bids, along with Medicare Advantage plans that have prescription drug coverage, and
takes the average weighted by previous year enrollment. CMS then takes a fraction
(around 70%) of this amount, which determines the subsidy given to the insurer per
enrollee, adjusted for an enrollee’s risk score.
Medicare beneficiaries typically choose which plan to enroll in during the Fall
Open Enrollment period (October 15 to December 7) for coverage to start in January
1. The premium an enrollee pays is the difference between the plan’s bid and the
per-enrollee decided by CMS. Individuals that choose the plan in this manner and
pay the premium are called Regular enrollees. CMS has an additional program, in
which low-income individuals are assigned randomly to low cost plans and do not
pay the premium. These Low-Income-Subsidy (LIS) enrollees can, nevertheless, opt
out from random assignment and choose a more expensive plan if willing to pay the
positive premium difference.
Insurers that offer a Part D prescription drug plan need to comply with a minimum
standard defined by CMS. As drug spending increases, these “basic”plan are often
characterized by having (i) an initial deductible, (ii) co-insurance or co-payment after
the deductible is met, and up to an initial coverage limit, (iii) a coverage gap or
doughnut hole, where the enrollee pays 100% of the drug cost after reaching the
initial coverage limit until reaching (iv) catastrophic coverage where the cost of the
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drug is greatly reduced once again. This piecewise mapping between spending and
out-of-pocket payments has been used to compute prescription drug elasticities (Einav
et al. 2015 and Einav et al. 2018). Insurers also sell “enhanced” plans, which have
higher actuarial value than basic plans. The extra coverage may come in the form of
better co-payments, lower deductibles, partial or total coverage in the doughnut hole,
or higher number of drugs covered.
Insurers are allowed to change plan characteristics every year, as long as they meet
the minimum standard coverage. In practice, premiums fluctuate much more than
the other plan characteristics over time. (Polyakova 2016). Nevertheless, insurers are
allowed to change the composition of pharmacies in network yearly, which requires
re-negotiation between pharmacies and insurers over reimbursement terms.
Insurers form a network of pharmacies - the set of pharmacies where their enrollees
can fill the prescriptions from - by bargaining over pharmacy reimbursement. This
reimbursement has to cover the cost of the pharmacy of acquiring the drug, plus
a profit margin for the pharmacy, which is the dispensing fee. The dispensing fee
is effectively the economic object of interest that pharmacies and insurers bargain
over. It needs to be enough to cover any fixed cost of operation for the pharmacy.
Little is known about the magnitude of dispensing fees, as data is not disclosed to
the public. The only information that is provided is from Medicaid, which posts
online the dispensing fees that it pays the pharmacies.2 Moreover, a study by the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS 2011) found that Medicaid pays
dispensing fees between $1 and $14. Nevertheless, such dispensing fee information is
not available for Medicare.
The role of CVS in the Medicare Part D has increase over time. CVS started
selling Part D plans after merging with Caremark Rx, Inc in March 2007. Since then,
2 Available at (accessed on September 15, 2018)
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/prescription-drugs/state-prescription-drug-resources/drug-
reimbursement-information/index.html
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CVS has actively tried to expand its operations in both the insurance and phar-
macy market, reiterating the need for studying the effects of integration on market
outcomes. As far as the health insurance market is concerned, CVS acquired Univer-
sal American’s Part D business in 2011 (for $1.25B) and Health Net’s in 2012 (for
$160M). By 2017, CVS was the third largest Part D provider (slightly behind Hu-
mana and UnitedHealth), with a nationwide market share of over 20%. In 2008, their
market share was only 3%. In addition, CVS is expected to acquire Aetna in 2018
(for $69B at the current negotiations). At the same time, CVS bought 500 Longs
Drugs pharmacies in 2008 – expanding its pharmacy business in Northern California
and Hawaii – for $2.9B (Longs Drugs was also present in the Part D market, making
this acquisition effectively both vertical and horizontal) and 1,672 Target pharmacies
along 47 states in 2015 for $1.9B.
1.3 Vertical foreclosure: Mechanism and model predictions
The ideal dataset to answer the market foreclosure question would include information
on the dispensing fees that each pharmacy charges to each health insurer. These
dispensing fees are not information that firms disclose to the public. This section
outlines a theoretical model that allows me to circumvent the lack of dispensing fee
data, by developing a relationship between premiums and observable variables. The
mechanism that links them together is the differential dispensing fees agreed between
different pharmacies and insurers.
At the end of this section, the model will allow me to make predictions regarding
premium differences between firms due to different dispensing fees bargained between
insurers and pharmacies, without actually observing them. The model is largely
based on Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) and Ho and Lee (2017), where different parties
bargain over intermediate prices and the solution maximizes the Nash product of each
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firms’ gains from trade. The full model solution can be found in Section A.1, and
here I present only its outline and predictions.3
In the context of the Medicare Part D market, health insurers choose an array
of characteristics for the plans they sell. These include premiums, deductibles, drug
formulary and pharmacy network. I focus on the decision to set premium and the
pharmacy network formation, and keep the assumption that premiums are chosen for
a pre-determined set of plan characteristics (as in Lucarelli et al. 2012 or Decarolis
et al. 2015). This adds the simplicity of modeling the choices in a sequential man-
ner. First, insurers bargain with pharmacies over the dispensing fee that the insurer
pays the pharmacy when an enrollee fills a prescription at their location. Successful
bargaining implies that a dispensing fee is profitable for both parties and, in this
case, the pharmacy belongs to the plan’s network, meaning that plan’s enrollees can
fill the prescription at that pharmacy. Second, insurers set premiums, given all plan
characteristics and the competitive environment in the market they serve.
To see how vertical foreclosure emerges in the market, consider how a health
insurer chooses the premiums for their plans. Theory suggests that premiums are
set as a mark-up over marginal cost, where the mark-up depends on the shape of
demand, q(p). The marginal cost – assumed constant in this exercise – for a health
insurer to enroll and Medicare Part D beneficiary is composed of two parts, one
that happens with certain, which corresponds to administrative costs for the firm,
c, net of any subsidies received from the government, s, and an uncertain one. The
uncertain component of the marginal cost occurs because not all enrollees will be sick
and need to purchase prescription drugs. I assume this happens with probability φ.
Moreover, when the enrollee becomes sick, there is a probability ρ that they will fill
a prescription at a CVS pharmacy, in which case the plan pays the dispensing fee
fcvs. If the enrollee fills the prescription at another pharmacy, the dispensing fee is
3I omit most of the subscripts in this section for the sake of exposition.
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fh. Finally, the insurance has to pay the drug cost, d.
4 The equilibrium premium,
p∗, set by a firm is, therefore:
p∗ =
[
c− s+ φ (ρf ∗cvs + (1− ρ)f ∗h + d)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected marginal cost
− q(p∗)(q′(p∗))−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mark-up
. (1.1)
Where the notation p∗ refers to the vector of equilibrium market premiums and
q residual demand (and q′ the derivative of demand with respect to price). The
superscript ∗ denotes equilibrium objects.
The dispensing fees are part of the insurers expected marginal cost. CVS, being an
vertically integrated firm, acts as a firm that would set the lowest possible dispensing
fee, which is the pharmacy’s marginal production cost, w. By doing this, CVS avoids
any double marginalization and guarantees to obtain the maximum profits for its
supply chain. At the same time, when CVS bargains with other insurers over the
dispensing fee, it takes into account that an increase in the dispensing fee for other
insurers positively affects the profits of their own insurance. This happens because
the dispensing fee increases the marginal cost for other insurers, and hence premiums,
and therefore consumers are more likely to switch to a CVS plan. The interaction
between firms and the vertically integrated CVS leads to the following result: The
dispensing fee insurers pay CVS is higher than the one they pay other pharmacies.
Equation (1.2) provides the basic intuition to estimate market foreclosure using
premium variation. To see this, note how premiums evolve differentially for CVS and
other insurers, as the probability of filling a prescription at a CVS pharmacy changes.
4The distinction in the pharmacy business is between CVS and all other pharmacies – which
I assume charge the same dispensing fee – because CVS is the only vertically integrated firm in
the market. All the other pharmacies do not have to charge the same dispensing fees. They can
set different amounts, which depends on their bargaining powers and cost of production, but their
objective function is the same for all because there is no stake in the downstream market.
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∂p∗
∂ρ
=
φ
2
(q′)2
(q′)2 − q′′ × q
[
∂c
∂ρ︸︷︷︸
Efficiency
effect
+ fcvs − fh︸ ︷︷ ︸
Foreclosure
effect
+ ρ
∂fcvs
∂ρ
+ (1− ρ)∂fh
∂ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bargaining
effect
]
(1.2)
The total effect is a combination of an efficiency, foreclosure and bargaining effect.
The efficiency effect is potentially negative and affects only CVS.
The foreclosure effect can be seen in the difference between the dispensing fee
charged by CVS and other firms. In particular, CVS acts as if fcvs = w, in order to
avoid double marginalization in its supply chain, and therefore fcvs − fh < 0. As the
probability of filling a prescription at a CVS pharmacy increases, CVS decreases their
premiums, ie, ∂p∗cvs/∂ρ < 0. For other insurers, the foreclosure effect is positive, as
CVS charges higher dispensing fees than other pharmacies, ie, fcvs− fh > 0, because
they internalize the positive effect that they have on their own insurance profits.
The bargaining effect amplifies the foreclosure effect. For CVS, this effect is neg-
ative. When owning more pharmacies, CVS increases its leverage and so pays lower
dispensing fees to other pharmacies. For other insurers, however, the effect is positive,
since the dispensing fee paid to CVS increases.
In practice, the implication suggests comparing the change in premiums of CVS
insurance plans with the premiums of other insurers as the probability of filling a
prescription in a CVS pharmacy changes. The model predicts that the increase in
probability should lead to a decrease in CVS premiums, but an increase in other
firm’s premiums. Intuitively, as it becomes more likely that plan enrollees visit a
CVS pharmacy, premiums decrease for CVS plans because they have to pay less
dispensing fees. Premiums for other insurers increase because these firms are more
likely to have to pay a higher dispensing fee to CVS pharmacies. The incentive that
CVS has to charge higher dispensing fees to health insurers comes from the fact that
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they internalize their insurance profits in the negotiation, that is, by increasing their
dispensing fees, CVS is able to forcefully increase the marginal cost of insurers and
premiums.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
Based on implications from the theoretical model, this section develops the empirical
strategy that estimates the causal impact of plan exposure to CVS pharmacies on
premiums. I create a measure of plan exposure to CVS pharmacies as the share of in-
network pharmacies that belong to CVS. Then, I estimate the impact of this variable
on plan premiums, differentially for CVS and other insurers. Finally, the endogeneity
of the exposure measure is controlled for with an instrument using the CVS-Target
acquisition of 2015 as a source of exogenous variation.
1.4.1 Reduced form evidence
The theoretical model suggests separately comparing premiums for CVS and other
plans as a function of the probability of filling a prescription at a CVS pharmacy.
To obtain an equation that can be estimated from the model, consider what happens
to premiums when this probability changes, seen in Equation (1.2). This change
is composed of two components. The first component depends on the shape of the
demand function for health insurance plans, and can be approximated with a vector of
plan characteristics, X. The second component shows how the probability of filling
a prescription at a CVS pharmacy affects marginal cost. For CVS plans, this is
negative, as CVS avoids paying the dispensing fee to other pharmacies. For other
health insurers, the impact on marginal cost is positive. The likelihood they have to
pay the dispensing fee to CVS in, which is higher than what other pharmacies charge,
increases. Therefore, the impact of exposure to CVS pharmacies on premiums needs
to be estimated separately for CVS and other insurers.
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Equation (1.3) shows the regression framework derived from the implications in
Equation (1.2) ready to be taken to the data.
log(pjmt) =αShareCV Sjmt + βShareCV Sjmt × I{CV SInsurerj}+ γXjmt + εjmt
(1.3)
In this pricing equation, the premium p of plan j in region (market) m and year
t is a function of the plan’s characteristics, Xjmt, such as deductibles, that affect
consumer’s plan choice and, therefore, premiums. In order to reduce the error coming
from unobservable plan characteristics that affect demand (such as brand preferences
from consumers), the vector Xjmt includes plan fixed effects.
ShareCV S is the empirical proxy for the probability of filling a prescription at a
CVS pharmacy, ρ in the model. Estimating this probability is out of the scope of this
paper. Indeed, doing so would require, at minimum, data regarding the number and
place of prescriptions filled for each plan, which is not included in the data available
for this paper. Therefore, I define ShareCV S, the proxy for ρ, as the share of CVS
pharmacies in plan j’s network. These two objects should be positively correlated; as
the share of CVS pharmacies in network increases, enrollees’ choice set is comprised of
more CVS pharmacies and therefore, should be more likely to visit a CVS pharmacy.
This term is interacted with an indicator variable, I{CV SInsurer}, which is equal
to 1 for plans sold by CVS Caremark. Therefore, β gives the differential impact on
premiums from increasing the share of CVS pharmacies in the network, according to
whether the plan belong to CVS or not. The model predicts that, if partial market
foreclosure is present in the market, α > 0, and that α + β < 0.
I include in the vector X plan fixed effects to control for unobserved plan charac-
teristics that might affect premiums. The variation in the share of CVS pharmacies
17
in network that I use is, for each plan, across time. That is, how the premium of a
plan changes from one year to the other when the share of CVS pharmacy the plan
has in its network changes in the same year. Because a plan is specific for a given
region, with borders well defined by law, this approach also controls for market fixed
effects. Finally, X includes yearly fixed effects to control for overall trends.
Literature on Medicare Part D has studied other mechanisms that affect plan
premiums that are not direct plan characteristics. First, Ericson (2014) establishes
the presence of consumer inertia and shows that inertia allow firms to engage in
“invest-then-harvest” strategies. He finds that older plans have premiums 10% higher
than comparable new plans. I controls this by adding the number of years the plan
has been on the market as a regressor. Second, Decarolis (2015) show that plans are
able to manipulate the LIS system in order to achieve higher premiums. As much
as one-third of the premium variation for Basic plans between 2006 and 2011 can be
explained by this manipulation. To control for this, I add as a regressor the number
of LIS enrollees that a plan had in the previous year, which proxies the incentive that
the plan has to manipulate the system.
1.4.2 Identification: CVS acquires Target
Estimating Equation (1.3) alone by OLS might give biased results on the impact
of having an additional CVS pharmacy on the network because of endogeneity. A
contract that brings together a insurance plan and a pharmacy under its network
is the result of a bargaining game between the two parties over the dispensing fee.
Successful network connections are made when such is profitable for both. Therefore,
to the extent to which the dispensing fee increases the plan’s marginal cost, and hence
premiums, the observed network is only for plans with small increases in premiums
that do not discourage negotiation. Estimating Equation (1.3) alone would bias the
true impact of adding pharmacies to the plan’s network towards zero.
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In order to obtain plausible causal estimates of the impact of exposure to CVS
pharmacies on premiums, I exploit the Target pharmacies acquisition by CVS. In
December 2015, CVS acquired 1,672 Target pharmacies across the US for 1.9 Billion
dollars. Figure 1·1 shows the location of CVS and Target pharmacies by zipcode,
before the merger. Target had pharmacies in 47 states, which allowed them to cover
the entire Part D market as some Part D regions are comprised of several states. The
merger not only strengthened CVS position in the markets it was already present, it
also allowed them to enter new states in the Pacific NorthWest, and Central area.
The CVS-Target acquisition is a good candidate for a source of exogenous variation
of Part D plans’ exposure to CVS pharmacies for two reasons. First, the widespread
presence of Target pharmacies suggests that the acquisition decision is not correlated
with local part D premiums, which could bias the estimates. Second, the vertical
nature of the acquisition means that there are not direct effects on premiums because
of consolidation. Instead, any effect from the merger into the market premiums must
come through the interplay between pharmacies and health insurers. Therefore, the
required assumption that the merger affects premiums through the effect on the share
of CVS pharmacies in network is likely to be valid.
Similarly to the approach by Dafny et al. (2012), I use the Target acquisition to
construct an instrument for the share of CVS pharmacies in network. I calculate
∆simShareCV S, the simulated change of the share of CVS pharmacies in network
for each plan j caused by the 2015 Target acquisition, as if there were no other
changes:
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Figure 1·1: Location of CVS and Target pharmacies
Firm
CVS
Target
Number of 
pharmacies 
in zipcode
1
2
3
4
5
6
Note: Number of pharmacies is measured at the zipcode level, for 2011.
∆simShareCV Sj =
# CVS pharmaj,2015 + # Target pharmaj,2015
Total pharmacies in networkj,2015
− # CVS pharmaj,2015
Total pharmacies in networkj,2015
=
# Target pharmaj,2015
Total pharmacies in networkj,2015
(1.4)
Note that ShareCV S enter Equation (1.3) as two separate regressors, since it
is interacted with a CVS insurer indicator, and so I need two instruments. Since
∆simShareCV S is calculated at the plan level, it varies across insurers within
the same market. Therefore, I propose as the two instruments the interactions
∆simShareCV Sj×postmerger and ∆simShareCV Sj×postmerger×I{CV SInsurer},
where postmerger takes the value 1 in 2017, and 0 before.
The hypothesis behind the instrument is that the vertical acquisition changed
the share of CVS pharmacies in network for each plan according to the share of
Target pharmacies in network before the acquisition. That is, plans with higher pre-
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acquisition Target pharmacies ended up with a higher share of CVS pharmacies after.
These two are not necessarily the same object as after the acquisition renegotiation
can occur. In Section 1.5.1, I show that positive correlation between the two, which
will be confirmed in the first-stage regressions. This method is akin to a differences-in-
differences design with continuous exposure to a policy change (an acquisition in this
case), but where the object of interest is the entire distribution of CVS pharmacies
over time and not the acquisition alone. The reduced form model, however, will show
the impact of the acquisition on premiums.
1.5 Data
The main source of this study is the publicly available data released by CMS. CMS
releases plan-level information of Medicare Part C and D. The focus of my analysis
is the Part D plans only, as part C plans are subject to other institutional details
that require a different analysis. The level of observation is a Part D plan-year pair,
followed between 2006 and 2017.5 The information release by CMS includes plan
characteristics, such as premiums, deductibles, plan generosity and enrollment. CMS
data also provides the network of each plan, that is, the set of pharmacies where a
plan’s enrollee can fill their prescriptions. This data is de-identified. I obtain the
crosswalk between the network data and the identity of the pharmacies from two
sources, the DataQ file from the National Council for Prescription Drug Programs
(for 2006 - 2011) and the National Plan and Provider Enumeration System (for 2012 -
2017). My focus is on retail pharmacies only. Mail-order pharmacies are typically run
in-house by the insurer or pharmacy benefit manager and, as such, are not subject
to the same competitive environment than retail pharmacies.
5Since insurers are not allowed to sell the same plan in different markets, the level of observation
is, in fact, at the plan-level-market.
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1.5.1 Summary statistics
I use plan-level data from an unbalanced panel between the years 2006 and 2017.
Each plan in the sample has been present in the market with positive enrollment for
at least two consecutive years. This corresponds to 3078 unique plans in 32 regions6
from 100 different firms. Table 1.1 shows the market-level averages for selected years.
The average number of firms in each market has decreases substantially since the
early years (after an initial increase in 2007), from 16.6 in 2006 to 9.7 in 2017. Each
firm offers 2 to 3 plans - typically at least one basic and one enhanced plan. As
a consequence, the average number of plans an individual can chose from has been
halved from 40.3 to 20.9 between 2006 and 2017. This wave of consolidation into a
smaller number of firms has led to an increase in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI), with this market being considered moderately concentrated, according to the
Department of Justice merger guidelines.
Table 1.1: Market summary statistics
2006 2007 2009 2011 2013 2016 2017
Number of firms 16.6 21.7 18.5 16.1 12.3 11.8 9.7
Number of plans per firm 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.3
Number of plans 40.3 52.2 46.9 30.9 27.0 24.9 20.9
Number of observations 1, 370 1, 775 1, 595 1, 052 917 846 709
HHI 1, 587 1, 784 1, 562 1, 704 1, 845 1, 959 2, 000
Notes: Table shows the evolution of market level summary statistics for selected
years between 2006 and 2017. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, computed
as the sum of the squared number of enrollees of each firm, in each region. Total
number of observations is 14,541.
Table 1.2 shows the main plan features that characterize a plan, along with, in the
last column, the correlation between a plan characteristic and the monthly premium.
On average, 10% of a plan’s network is composed of CVS pharmacies, with a median
6I remove Alaska and Hawaii from the analysis.
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of 11%. The correlation with premium is positive, but very small. Around half of
the plans are basic, which have a lower premium due to lower actuarial value than
enhanced plan and the average yearly deductible is 141$. As is typical in insurance
plan design, plans with higher deductibles have lower premiums. Doughnut Hole
coverage is a feature of enhanced plans. Hence, only 25% of all plans have some sort
of coverage in the doughnut hole. Plans have flexibility to design the type of coverage
in the doughnut hole, and so I stipulate the coverage exists for any level of generosity.
Finally, a plan has, on average, almost 2,000 local pharmacies in their network. In
defining local pharmacies, I only consider the network of pharmacies that operate in
one of the zip-codes where a plan can be sold.
Table 1.2: Plan summary characteristics
Mean Median St. Dev. Corr w/ Premium
Monthly Premium ($ ) 47.05 38.80 25.38 1
Share CVS pharmacies 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.03
Is a Basic plan 0.52 1 0.50 -0.53
Yearly Deductible ($ ) 140.85 75 148.41 -0.43
Has Doughnut Hole coverage 0.25 0 0.43 0.67
Local pharmacies in network 1, 9569 1, 724 1, 339 0.04
Notes: Statistics are across all plans and all years. Total number of observations
is 14,541.
Figure 1·2 shows the evolution of the average Part D premium for plans in the
sample, separately for CVS plans and other firms. The upper panel shows this evolu-
tion for Basic plans, while the lower panel focus on enhanced plans. The data is not
a balanced panel, so the number of observations is not constant over time. Moreover,
because CVS has acquired some of the other firms throughout this period, some plans
label as “Other” switch to CVS. The first year with data for CVS is 2008 because
CVS entered the market with the acquisition of Caremark in 2007.
CVS has slightly lower than average premiums for Basic plans for most of the
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sample period, especially in the later years. This is consistent with the high share
of low LIS enrollees that CVS has (Decarolis 2015). As far as Enhanced plans are
concerned, the pattern is of increasing premiums over time. CVS has followed the
average premiums until 2014, and charged higher premiums thereafter.
Figure 1·2: Average plan premium over time by type of plan.
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Notes: Premium average is over all plans in a given year. Not adjusted for inflation. N =
14,541.
Figure 1·3 shows the evolution of the share of CVS pharmacies that belong to
a plan’s network and are located in the same service area as the plan (eg, CVS
pharmacies in California only count for plans sold in California). Both CVS and
other insurers have a similar share of local CVS pharmacies in their network, which
on average amounts to 10% of each plan’s network. For the most part, CVS actually
has a lower share of its own pharmacies in network, but that can be explained by
having a larger overall network. Between 2006 and 2015 there is a small upwards
trend, fueled by the CVS acquisition of Longs Drugs in 2008 - barely visible in the
figure since Longs was only present in a few states, and a big player only in California
- and a large jump from 2015 to 2016. This corresponds to the CVS acquisition of
24
Target pharmacies, and increased the average share of CVS pharmacies in a plan’s
network by around 20%.
Figure 1·3: Share of CVS pharmacies in a plan’s network
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Notes: Only pharmacies that belong to the same zipcodes where the plan is active
are included. CVS has not disclosed its network information for 2013 because their
plans were sanctioned by the CMS.
Table 1.3 shows what percentage of local pharmacies are in a plan’s network. The
vast majority of plans have in their network virtually all CVS and Target pharmacies.
This implies that differences in premiums due to exposure to CVS pharmacies occur
not because of plans choosing these pharmacies - as they seem to be locked in in all
of them - but rather to the extent to which there are other pharmacies that can be
used as an outside option to leverage on the negotiation. Moreover, plans that do not
have CVS pharmacies in their network tend to be smaller plans. For these reasons,
I do not analyze differences in premiums between plans that have CVS pharmacies
in network and do not. As far as the total number of pharmacies in network, plans
include in their network, on average, 81% of the existing pharmacies in their location,
ranging between 45% and 95%.
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Table 1.3: Share of existing pharmacies in network
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max
CVS 0.98 0.07 0.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
Target 0.99 0.08 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Total 0.81 0.07 0.45 0.77 0.82 0.86 0.95
Note: Share computed as the number of local pharmacies of a given firm di-
vided by the total number of existing firms in that market. Years 2008, 2009
and 2011. N = 6,046.
1.5.2 CVS-Target merger
Figure 1·4 shows the geographical distribution of the average share of Target phar-
macies in a plan’s network for 2015. Target covers the entire Part D market, and
the average share of Target pharmacies in each market ranges from less than 1% to
almost 5%. Despite the fact that Target is not one of the largest pharmacy chains,
the acquisition by CVS allowed the share of CVS pharmacies to increase by around
20%, as shown in Figure 1·3. Overall, Figure 1·5 shows that, for most plans, the
Target pharmacies acquisition was expected to increase the share of CVS pharmacies
in network up to 40%.
Figure 1·6 shows the relationship between the instrument and the actual share
of CVS pharmacies in network for 2017. The relationship is positive, meaning that
plans with larger share of Target pharmacies in network had higher fraction of CVS
pharmacies in network after the acquisition. This relationship is not being driven
by differential pre-trends between CVS and other firms, as Figure 1·3 shows a very
similar pattern for both.
1.6 Premium analysis results
The result of estimating Equation (1.3) can be seen in Table 1.4. The first column
is the most basic specification where I compare premiums differently for CVS Part
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Figure 1·4: Share of Target pharmacies in network across markets
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Figure 1·5: Simulated increase of the share of CVS pharmacies as a
fraction of CVS pharmacies in 2015
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Figure 1·6: Relationship between instrument and Share of CVS in
2017
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Notes: Figure plots the share of CVS pharmacies in network in 2017 as a function
of the simulated increase in the CVS share in 2015. Simulated increase is calculated
as the change in the share of CVS pharmacies in network as if all Target pharmacies
in 2015 belonged to CVS. This equation is detailed in Equation (1.4).
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D plans and plans from other insurers, according to the share of CVS pharmacies
that each plan has in its network. In this specification, there is no evidence of sta-
tistical differences in premiums between CVS and other insurers due to the share of
CVS pharmacies in network, as the estimated interaction coefficient is imprecisely
estimated. When adding year fixed effects to control for the overall trend in premi-
ums, in column 2, the interaction term becomes negative, as suggested by the model,
but not statistically different from zero. Column 3 adds the plan characteristics that
should affect demand, and the estimates reinforce the model implication that pre-
miums should decrease for CVS with the share of CVS pharmacies in network. The
interaction coefficient increases in magnitude and it is statistically distinguishable
from zero.
The first three columns exploit variation in the share of CVS pharmacies in net-
work across different plans. However, any unobserved plan characteristics that might
be correlated with both premiums and the pharmacy network will still bias the esti-
mated coefficients. The last two columns of Table 1.4 add plan-level fixed effects to
control for unobserved plan characteristics, thus exploiting only changes in premiums
as the share of CVS pharmacies in network changes over time. Both specifications
confirm the model implication that having a higher share of CVS pharmacies de-
creases premiums for CVS, while increasing them for other insurers. In the most
demanding specification, column 5, a increase of 1 percentage point in the share of
CVS pharmacies in network increases premiums by 2% for insurers, while decreasing
premiums by 1.06% (= 2.045 - 3.113) for CVS.
As far as the instrumental variable specification is concerned, Table 1.5 shows
the strength of the instrument. The coefficient for ∆simShareCV S × postmerger is
estimated very closely to 1 for insurers that are not CVS, indicating that, on average,
the share of CVS pharmacies increased in the exact amount as the pre-acquisition
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Table 1.4: Impact of CVS pharmacies on Part D plan premiums
Dep. Var = Log(premium)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of CVS pharma. in network 0.174 0.051 −0.036 2.061∗∗∗ 2.045∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.153) (0.092) (0.311) (0.290)
Share of CVS pharma. × I{CVS} 0.466 −0.394 −0.945∗∗∗ −5.874∗∗∗ −3.113∗∗∗
(0.494) (0.506) (0.247) (1.225) (1.178)
I{CVS} 0.022 0.071 0.026
(0.049) (0.051) (0.031)
I{Basic} −0.040∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.013)
Deductible ($100 ) −0.078∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
I{Doughnut hole coverage} 0.520∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.018)
# pharma. in network (1000 ) 0.019∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.038)
# of years plan on market 0.031∗∗∗ 0.058∗
(0.003) (0.034)
# of LIS enrolleest−1 (1000) −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plan fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Number of unique clusters 3,051 3,051 3,051 3,051 3,051
Observations 12,019 12,019 12,019 12,019 12,019
R2 0.002 0.088 0.563 0.842 0.850
Notes: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Standard errors clustered at the plan level. LIS = Low Income Subsidy. Each observations is a pair
plan-year, followed between 2006 and 2017.
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amount of Target pharmacies. For CVS, however, the coefficient estimated at 1.16
suggests that, after the acquisition, CVS removed some of other pharmacies from
its network and increased the share of their own pharmacies more than proportion-
ally. The Sanderson-Windmeijer F-statistic shows that the instruments are strong
predictors of the share of CVS in network.
Table 1.5: First stage
Dependent variable:
Share CVS Share CVS × I{CVS}
∆simShareCV S × postmerger 0.974∗∗∗ −0.008
(0.103) (0.011)
∆simShareCV S × postmerger × I{CV SInsurer} 0.097∗∗ 1.157∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.024)
I{Basic} −0.0003 0.00004
(0.001) (0.0002)
Deductible ($1000 ) −0.013∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.001)
I{Doughnut hole coverage} 0.001 −0.001∗
(0.001) (0.0003)
# pharmacies in network (1000 ) −0.002 −0.0004
(0.006) (0.0004)
Number of years plan on market 0.0004 −0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Number of LIS enrolleest−1 (1000) 0.00001 0.00002
(0.00002) (0.00001)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Plan fixed effects Yes Yes
S-W F-stat: 116.45 3854.19
Number of unique clusters 1,177 1,177
Observations 6,148 6,148
Note: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Standard errors clustered at the plan level. LIS = Low Income Subsidy. Each observations is
a pair plan-year, followed between 2006 and 2017.
The results of the IV estimation are in Table 1.6. The first column shows the
OLS results using the sample that can be used for the IV model. The sample size
gets halved in this specification as it requires each plan to be present in 2015, the
year used to construct the IV. Any plan that is not present on the market in 2015 is
removed in the following regressions. Nevertheless, the OLS results are robust to this
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selected sample. The reduced form model shows that premiums increased more after
the acquisition for insurers with higher simulated change in the share of CVS. For a
mean ∆simShareCV S of 0.025 (the average share of Target pharmacies in network
per plan in 2015), the merger increased premiums by 9.1% (= 3.654*0.025*100) for
insurers, while increasing CVS premiums by 1.01% (= (3.654 - 3.216)*0.025*100).
The IV estimation shows a larger coefficient for the share of CVS pharmacies that
is larger than the OLS, as expected due to downwards bias present in the OLS. This
coefficients shows that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of CVS pharmacies
in network causes a 3.7% increase in premiums of insurers other than CVS. For CVS
plans, however, the effect disappears; there is no statistical evidence that an increase
in the share of CVS pharmacies in network leads to a change in premiums for CVS
plans.
1.6.1 Discussion
The theoretical model allows to interpret the results in terms of firm behavior, as well
as rule out other explanations that could justify the findings.
The evidence for market foreclosure rests on the fact that premiums increase
with exposure to CVS pharmacies only for other insurers. If the only effect was
savings from integration between CVS pharmacies and plans that translate into lower
premiums, then the strategic complementary in premiums would give incentives for
other firms to lower their premiums as well.
The model predicts that efficiency gains between pharmacies and insurers would
lead to a decrease in premiums, but this implication is not supported in the data. If
efficiency gains were the only effect, then premiums would decrease for CVS, but also
for other firms due to the strategic effect. The causal estimates show no evidence
of impact of exposure on CVS premiums. It is important to notice that premium
complementaries between firms ameliorate any impact from efficiency gains, as CVS
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Table 1.6: Reduced form and 2SLS
Dep. Var. = Log(premium)
OLS Reduced form 2SLS
Share of CVS pharmacies in network 1.943∗∗∗ 3.727∗∗∗
(0.390) (1.383)
Share of CVS pharmacies × I{CVS} −2.862∗∗ −3.092∗∗
(1.365) (1.214)
∆simShareCV S × postmerger 3.654∗∗∗
(1.388)
∆simShareCV S × postmerger −3.216∗∗
×I{CV SInsurer} (1.368)
I{Basic} −0.168∗∗∗ −0.169∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Deductible ($1000 ) 0.215∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.075) (0.075)
I{Doughnut hole coverage} 0.101∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
# pharmacies in network (1000 ) 0.123∗∗ 0.121∗∗ 0.126∗∗
(0.049) (0.050) (0.050)
Number of years plan on market 0.001 0.025 −0.002
(0.047) (0.043) (0.050)
Number of LIS enrolleest−1 (1000) −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Plan fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of unique clusters 1,177 1,177 1,177
Observations 6,148 6,148 6,148
Note: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Standard errors clustered at the plan level. 2SLS uses as the instrument for Share
of CVS pharmacies the ∆simShareCV S × postmerger. LIS = Low Income Sub-
sidy. Each observations is a pair plan-year, followed between 2006 and 2017.
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has an incentive to increase their premiums along with other firms. This suggest that
CVS is not able to take advantage of efficiency gains from integration or, any gains
are modest and not enough to decrease their premiums, does not translating into any
positive consumer welfare.
A change in the exposure to CVS might also change premiums by causing changes
in leverage. Having more CVS pharmacies allows them to both negotiate better dis-
pensing fees with other insurance, and avoid paying them as often to other pharmacies.
The lack of evidence of the impact of exposure on CVS premium suggest that CVS
has a higher bargaining power towards other pharmacies, since results suggest no pre-
mium advantages from increasing exposure. This hypothesis is particularly appealing
because of the businesses CVS is involved in. First, they are a larger insurer, which
increases their leverage against pharmacies. Second, they own their own pharmacies,
and so their outside option is higher.
1.7 Demand Estimation
The analysis on plan premiums showed evidence of market foreclosure by CVS. Nev-
ertheless, most plans still have CVS pharmacies in their network. This section aims
at explaining the reasons why plans still contract with CVS pharmacies, despite the
effects on premiums. A demand model for plan choice allows me to estimate what
is valuable for consumers to have in an insurance plan, which explains behavior of
firms.
I use the demand model to focus on three questions that allow me to explain what
makes an insurer contracting with CVS. First, I analyze the impact of a larger network
on consumers utility, that is, the extent to which consumer prefer a larger network.
Second, for a given network size, whether consumers prefer to have a distribution of
in-network pharmacies that contains more CVS-owned pharmacies. Finally, whether
34
consumers value having both a CVS plan and a distribution of in-network pharmacies
skewed towards CVS-owned pharmacies. This last point directly measures the value
that consumers attributed to the vertical integration in this market.
1.7.1 Plan demand model
I estimate a discrete choice model for insurance plan choice based on Lucarelli et al.
(2012) and Decarolis et al. (2015), but I add to the utility function plan characteristics
that allow me to analyze consumer preferences for CVS pharmacies and integration
between insurer and pharmacies.
The theoretical model shows that an insurer contracts with a pharmacy because
of the expected increase in demand coming from having the additional pharmacy in
network. As long as consumers value having a plan with a large network, adding an
extra pharmacy will increase demand for the plan, as well as profits.
Consumer’s decision to purchase a plan depends not only on the network size, but
also on different firms that own the pharmacies in network. 7 In particular, consumers
might prefer, or not, plans that have more CVS pharmacies in their network than
plans with less. On top of that, there is also scope for consumers to prefer CVS plans
because they are integrated with CVS pharmacies.
There are two main types of beneficiaries in Medicare Part D: Regular enrollees
and LIS enrollees. Regular enrollees observe plan characteristics and choose which
plan to enroll, paying the corresponding premium. LIS enrollees are randomly as-
signed to a plan with a premium lower than an yearly LIS Subsidy Amount (LIPSA).
If they choose to, they can opt out of the random assignment and choose any plan. If
the premium of the plan they choose is higher than the LIPSA, the individual pays
the difference.
7Consumers preferences depend also on the distance they live from each pharmacy, but that is
out of the scope of this paper since I use only plan-level data.
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I start by modeling regular enrollees. The indirect utility function of a regular
enrollee i, who lives in market m at time t, and chooses plan j is modeled as:
uijmt =− αipjmt +Xjmt + βShareCV Sjmt+ (1.5)
βCV SShareCV Sjmt × I{CV SInsurerj}+ ξjmt + εijmt
Essentially, I model a consumer indirect utility as a function of the premium,
pjmt and the same set of plan characteristics as in the reduced-form price equations,
Xjmt. The term ξjmt corresponds to an unobserved plan valuation that is potentially
correlated with the premium. I also include firm fixed effects to capture consumer
preferences for different brands of insurance companies. Finally, I add the number of
years a plan has been in the market to control for switching costs, in the sense that
consumers prefer to remain in an older plan than switching to a new one (similar
approach to Decarolis et al. 2015, Fleitas 2017 or Starc and Swanson 2018).
There are three particular variables to analyze. The first is the overall size of
the plan’s in-area network, that is, the number of pharmacies where a plan’s enrollee
can fill their prescriptions. This variable capture the extent to which consumer draw
utility from having a larger set of options to fill their prescriptions, regardless of the
pharmacy ownership. For a consumer, a larger set of pharmacies to choose from
translate into a higher likelihood of having the most preferred pharmacy. The second
is the share of CVS pharmacies that belong to a plan network. This speaks to
the preference that consumers attribute to having CVS pharmacies, as opposed to
pharmacies owned by another company. Lastly, The interaction between the share of
CVS pharmacies with a CVS plan indicator (that takes the value 1 if plan j is sold
by CVS). The interaction between the two measures how consumers prefer to have
a higher share of CVS pharmacies in network and a plan that belongs to CVS. In
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other words, it measures how consumers value the integration between the insurer
and pharmacies.
I define the outside option as not buying a prescription drug plan insurance or
buying one through Medicare Advantage (Part C), and parameterize the utility of
the outside option as ui0mt = 0. For the purpose of calculating market shares, I use
as the denominator the total number of Medicare beneficiaries in a given year-region.
The pair year-region constitutes a market.
For estimation purposes, I assume that ijmt follows a Type-I extreme value dis-
tribution. This common assumption allows me to get a closed-form solution for the
probability of a individual buying a given plan, which determines the markets share.
Following Berry (1994), I first assume that consumer disutility with respect to price
is contact for all enrollees, that is, αi = α ∀i. Therefore, the equation that I take to
the data is:
log(sjmt)− log(s0mt) =− φpjmt + γXjmt + αShareCV Sjmt+ (1.6)
βShareCV Sjmt × I{CV SInsurerj}+ ξjmt
The error term in Equation (1.6) is the unobservable plan valuation, which is
potentially correlated with premium. To address this endogeneity issue, I instrument
for the premium using a Hausman-type instrument. In particular, for each plan I
calculate the average premium of plan of the same type - basic or enhanced - belonging
to the same firm in other aggregated regions. To create an aggregated region, for the
purpose of constructing the instrument, I divide the U.S. in three areas: East, Center,
West. The idea behind this instrument is that firm-specific cost shocks affect prices
in an exogenous way to market shocks. In order to avoid contamination of market-
specific shocks, the instrument looks at the premiums in other far away regions, which
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is the reason why the aggregated regions are so broadly defined.
I also estimate the more flexible case where the premium disutility is allowed to
vary with each individual, ai, based on Berry et al. (1995). This method has the
advantage of allowing more flexibility in the substitution patterns between plans.
1.7.2 Plan demand estimates
The result of estimating equation Equation (1.6) can be seen in Table 1.7. Columns
(1) and (2) show the OLS estimates, while (3) and (4) show the instrumental variable
approach. These first 4 columns assume that all consumers have the same premium
disutility parameter. Column (5) relaxes this assumption and allows the premium
disutility to vary with the individual, following the estimation method in Berry et al.
(1995). Columns (3)-(5) all require an instrument for the yearly premium. The
instrument used is the average premium that a firm charges for the other plans that
sells in other regions. Finally, columns (2) and (4) adds as plan characteristics the
number of years a plan has been on the market.
The premium coefficient is estimated at a negative value for all specifications,
and remarkably constant across OLS and IV. For the BLP estimate, the coefficient
is around twice as large in magnitude. These estimates are between he ones found
by Decarolis et al. (2015) and Fleitas (2017). Nevertheless, the time horizon on the
analysis is different.
Overall, the demand estimation shows that consumers value a larger network, as
well as plans that have a higher emphasis on CVS pharmacies, Moreover, consumers
draw positive utility from having vertically integrated plans. The coefficient on the
number of pharmacies in network - the size of the network - is positive and statis-
tically significant. The estimates are robust across specifications and suggest that
consumers value having a larger set of pharmacies in network from which to choose
from. Regarding the distribution of pharmacy ownership, for a given network size,
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the coefficient on the share of CVS pharmacies in network cannot be distinguishable
from zero, despite being always estimated at a positive value and not robust to model
specification. When interacted with the CVS plan ownership indicator, the coefficient
remains positive but indistinguishable from zero.
Assessing these results in the context of the theoretical model, the incentives
that insurers have to contract with CVS pharmacies is two-fold. First, the overall
effect that a larger network size has on demand. CVS is the largest pharmacy chain
and so insurers need to contract with them in order for their plans not to be at a
disadvantage. Second, consumer also value CVS pharmacies more than the average,
and insurers have an incentive put higher weight on CVS pharmacies than the ones
owned by other firms.
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1.8 Conclusion
Vertical mergers and acquisition have not historically been subject to much scrutiny
in the health care sector. Only recently in the U.S. are authorities considering the
effects of vertical integration on merger cases. The proposed CVS acquisition of
Aetna, which would likely be blocked by the Department of Justice, has now become
more likely in light of recently developments. If the acquisition is successful, Aetna
has agreed to sell its Medicare Part D business to WellCare for a currently undisclosed
amount.
Understanding the effect of vertical integration on market outcomes is of special
importance given that economic theory has ambiguous implications for welfare. On
one hand, vertical integration avoids double marginalization and might lead to effi-
ciency gains. On the other hand, it gives incentives for upstream firms to market
foreclose downstream competitors.
I study the extent to which there is market foreclosure in the context of the
Medicare Part D prescription Drug program. In this market, CVS both sells insurance
plans and owns pharmacies. Therefore, it has incentives to charge higher dispensing
fees to other insurers that want to include CVS pharmacies in their network.
I develop a theoretical model of bargaining between insurers and pharmacies, since
there is no data available for dispensing fees. The model enables me to assess the
existence of market foreclosure using premium variation only. The model predicts
that as exposure to CVS pharmacies increases, premiums for CVS plans decrease and
increase for other insurers.
I find evidence of market foreclosure by CVS. As the share of CVS pharmacies
in network increases, premiums increase for non-CVS insurers, but not for CVS. The
model rationalizes these results with foreclosure being the main mechanism that is
driving the premium differential. The fact that premiums do not decrease for CVS
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implies that efficiency gains from vertical integration are, at best, too small to put
downward pressure on CVS premiums.
The results from a demand model of plan choice show what consumers value
in their prescription drug plans. I find that consumer have a preference for large
networks, as a large network increases the likelihood of a consumer’s most preferred
pharmacy being in the plan’s network. Moreover, I find weak evidence that consumers
have a preference for CVS pharmacies and for integration between their plan with
pharmacies.
All in all, economic policy towards vertical integration in market has to balance
factors that affect welfare in opposite ways. In the Medicare Part D prescription drug
program, the integration between insurers and pharmacies leads to market foreclosure,
where consumers end up paying higher premiums. Nevertheless, this integration is
valuable for consumers, which can justify the higher premiums.
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Chapter 2
Demand Elasticities by Type of Service
This chapter is joint work with Randall P. Ellis and Wenjia Zhu.
2.1 Introduction
This paper revisits the classic issue of price elasticities of demand for health care
services, a topic of central importance for understanding moral hazard and optimal
insurance plan design, as well as having important implications for health plan choice,
access to care, health care cost containment, risk adjustment, and financial risk. More-
over, since modern insurance plans incorporate highly specific benefit plan features
in their designs, and these features can be customized for demographic, employment,
or geographically-defined groups, understanding demand responses for disaggregated
service types is of significant policy interest. In this paper we use a novel instrumental
variable technique on a very large sample (171 million person-months) to generate es-
timates of short-run price elasticities of demand among the privately insured for both
aggregated and disaggregated types of services and population subgroups. Many of
our elasticities, particularly for services that are not widely used (e.g., MRIs, mental
health/substance abuse treatment, lab tests, and ambulance use), are infeasible to
estimate on small or modest size samples.
A notable challenge when estimating price elasticities of demand for health care
is to control for endogeneity of prices stemming from endogenous health plan choice.
Several estimation strategies have been used in previous studies to overcome this
difficulty, including randomized control trials (RCTs) (Manning et al. 1987), natural
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experiments (Duarte 2012; Brot-Goldberg et al. 2017), and instrumental variable
strategies (Eichner 1998; Einav et al. 2015; Kowalski 2016; Scoggins and Weinberg
2017). Manning et al. (1987) estimated health care demand responses using RCT
data from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) conducted in the mid-
1970s, with path-breaking results, but the HIE sample size of 6000 individuals limits
its ability to generate estimates of demand response other than for broad categories
of services and large subpopulations.
Since RCTs such as the HIE are expensive and rare, many studies have exploited
natural experiments that induce changes in prices to estimate demand responsiveness.
Duarte (2012) is a good recent example: he uses Chilean data with a large number
of diverse health plans to study the demand response of both elective (home visits,
psychologist visits, physical therapy evaluations) and acute (appendectomy, cholecys-
tectomy, arm cast) health care services when government mandates forced employers
to increase their coverage generosity. In the similar spirit, Brot-Goldberg et al. (2017)
exploit a natural experiment in health insurance coverage when one large company
forced all of its employees to switch to a high-deductible plan. They find a consid-
erable demand response, even among sick people who expect to exceed deductibles
and face low end-of-year prices, suggesting that many people are myopic, responding
strongly to the spot prices at the time of care is received, and not only the more
theoretically correct expected end-of-year price.
A final approach for estimating unbiased elasticities is to use instrumental vari-
ables to control for the endogeneity of prices (cost shares) within a given year. Eichner
(1998) proposes a novel instrument for within-year price variation: the occurrence of
accidental injuries (e.g., a broken leg) by dependents as an exogenous event that
changes subsequent cost sharing and hence affects the employees own demand for
medical care. Building on the Eichner (1998) framework, Kowalski (2016) uses emer-
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gency department spending for injuries by other family members in households with
at least four members for her estimation of demand responsiveness, where the instru-
ment (whether a family member incurs spending for an injury) derives its power from
the fact that the event increases the likelihood that the family deductible or stop loss
can be exceeded, thus reducing the marginal price of care faced by the remaining
household members. Einav et al. (2015) use government changes in the Medicare
Part D coverage for prescription drugs as an instrument to study consumer responses
to cost sharing, while Scoggins and Weinberg (2017) use the plan characteristics as
an instrument for the actual observed cost share in claims data. In each case the
instrument is based on information that is arguably exogenous to the individuals own
health expenditure experience.
The two main contributions of this paper are its use of a readily-available and pow-
erful new instrument, and its use of extremely large data. In our sample, each person
contributes twelve monthly observations on endogenous cost sharing and spending
decisions. We include person-year fixed effects to absorb all aspects of the employer,
health plan, locality, supply side prices and availability, family, and individual pa-
tient health and taste variation from estimation, and then estimate elasticities using
monthly data. We also control for seasonality using monthly dummies. We argue
that the remaining variation in individual within-year cost sharing comes from the
nonlinear price schedules in health plans created by deductibles and stoplosses, which
we use to estimate the effects of cost sharing on demand. To control for cost shar-
ing endogeneity, we use the employer-, year-, and plan-level leave out one average
monthly cost share as an instrument for individual cost shares, exploiting the fact
that different firms, and different health plans have widely different within-year vari-
ation in their cost sharing. We provide evidence that these employer average cost
shares at the plan level have considerable power and are very weakly correlated with
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the average health status of plan enrollees.
We estimate elasticities using commercial claims data from 2007-2014 on 171 mil-
lion person-months, which allows us to estimate elasticities for very detailed types of
health care services, not usually possible due to the low utilization rates for many
such services. Understanding how consumers react to changes in cost shares for spe-
cific services is important to understand how insurers design their health plans to
control for moral hazard and to select services to offer. In that sense, our paper is
similar to Einav et al. (2018), which estimates demand elasticities for more than 150
pharmaceutical drugs in Medicare Part D.
We are not aware of any other research studies that have used employer-year-plan
level average monthly cost shares to be used as instruments. Our instrument does
not rely on any detailed characteristics of health plans, such as the actual value of
deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance rates, which makes it a useful instrument
for large claims data with few employer, plan, geographic, household, or individual
level variables. The method can readily be used to model spending or utilization at
any level of aggregation or subsample including at the level of individual procedures
and drugs.
Let us give a glimpse of our findings before proceeding. We find clear evidence
of short run response to within-year variations in cost sharing: people do respond
to within-year price variation. We explore two types of price expectations, which
we call backward myopic and forward myopic, and argue that they provide upper
and lower bounds for the myopic spot prices consumers seem to use when deciding
how much to spend on each type of health care service in a given month. Our two
myopic prices generate demand elasticities that are quite similar for commonly used
services, but backward myopic assumption generates more stable results for rarely
used services. We estimate elasticities of -0.44 for backward myopic expectations
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versus -0.41 for forward myopic expectations. This estimate is consistent with the
Manning et al. (1987) estimate of -0.2 and the Aron-Dine et al. (2013) reestimation
using the HIE data, which is -0.5. We find heterogeneity in the price elasticity of
demand across services, health plans, and population subgroups. The highest elastic-
ities are for pharmaceuticals (-0.44), specialty visits (-0.32), and spending on mental
health/substance abuse (-0.26), and the lowest elasticities are for prevention visits
(-0.02), emergency rooms (-0.04) and mammogram (-0.11). Supporting Einav et al.
(2013), we find evidence of not only biased selection but also heterogeneity in price
responsiveness, with consumers in health plans that have large changes in cost shar-
ing (e.g., HDHP) yielding higher estimated demand elasticities than HMOs. Demand
elasticities also vary modestly by enrollee age, risk scores, time, single versus family
coverage, salary versus hourly wage earners, industry, firm size, and firm level average
costing.
2.2 Data
We use IBM/Truven Health MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounter Database
from 2007 to 2014 to identify and extract the claims and enrollment information for all
large employers with at least three years of enrollment information and identifiable
plan identifiers. We checked for but did not find any employers with annual plan
enrollment periods other than the calendar year. We included all individuals, aged
0 to 64, eligible for the full 12 calendar months of the year, and remaining in the
same identified health plan, identified using MarketScans Plankey, a unique health
plan identifier. We require at least one month of eligibility in the year prior to the
prediction year, in order to be able to use lagged information for the evaluation (but
not estimation) of our results. We sum up total covered payments and out-of-pocket
(OOP) payments in each calendar month for various types of services. All dollar
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amounts were converted into December 2014 dollars by dividing by the appropriate
monthly personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator for health care costs from
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. Monthly spending was also adjusted for the
number of days in the month to remove this minor monthly variation in spending.
For observations in which monthly spending by an individual is positive, we de-
fine the cost share as the ratio between out-of-pocket spending and total spending.
Negative or less than $1 of spending was reset to zero, as likely reflecting payment ad-
justments, not actual service provision. Knowing the value of the counterfactual cost
share if the individual had positive spending is of considerable interest for studying
the decision to seek care, yet there is little information about how such expectations
are formed. We discuss below our approach for assigning service specific cost shares
(i.e. prices) relevant to consumers for choosing spending levels. We also conduct
sensitivity analysis of dropping plans that rely heavily on copayments rather than
cost sharing since incentives and responsiveness could be quite different in the two.
Although the plan type of each health plan is not used in our estimation ap-
proach, we use plan types to evaluate our results. For this study we included only
people enrolled in one of the following six plan types: health maintenance organiza-
tion (HMO), point of service (POS), preferred provider organization (PPO), compre-
hensive (COMP), consumer-directed health plan (CDHP) and high deductible health
plan (HDHP). MarketScan differentiates the CDHP and HDHP from other plan types
not by the size of their deductibles but instead by whether there is a flexible spending
account (CDHP), a health savings account (HDHP), or neither (PPO or POS). Some
PPO or POS plans have high deductibles, while not all CDHP have high cost sharing.
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Our final estimation sample used here has data from 73 employers with 732 plans
and information on 14.2 million individual years in six plan types (Table B.2). The
mean age is 34.1 years (Table B.1), and average annual total covered spending is
$4,648. This large panel enables us to estimate own-price demand elasticities not only
for common, but also for relatively rare health care services, as well as for various
employee and population subgroups. To illustrate our method, we estimate elasticities
for both for broad categories of services (inpatient, outpatient, and pharmacy) as
well as for a variety of non-exhaustive specialized types of service (for example, ER,
chiropractic, MRIs, PET scans, ambulance). Table 2.1 display summary statistics for
the categories of services modeled here.
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2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 What prices (or cost shares) matter?
For most goods, a consumer can choose how much to spend without worrying about
how her own spending may change the marginal prices paid. Deductibles, coverage
ceilings, and stoplosses introduce nonlinearities so that the rational consumer looks
ahead when making purchasing decisions. In the path-breaking work by Keeler and
Rolph (1988), the appropriate price for consumers to use is the expected end-of-year
price. Ellis (1986) refined this by modeling how risk-aversion may matter: consumers
should optimally make choices using the end-of-year shadow price, which will be
lower for a risk-averse person with a declining block prices than the expected price.
Although it is valuable to have models of the fully rational consumer, most recent
studies, such as by Aron-Dine et al. (2015), Einav et al. (2015), and Brot-Goldberg
et al. (2017), as well as the numerous studies by behavioral economists in other
settings, suggest that consumers are considerably more myopic than models of rational
consumer suppose.
In this paper, we focus on short-run demand responses, namely consumer re-
sponses to spot prices captured in the monthly cost shares in each month. Consumer
responses to these declining monthly spot prices during the year can occur for two
different reasons. One reason is that consumers are myopic, and fail to forecast how
their current spending affects future prices. The other, and perhaps more impor-
tant reason, is that responses to spot prices can reflect perfectly rational behavior
in response to unexpected health shocks that change prices in unanticipated ways.
Although they are conceptually distinct, in this paper we do not distinguish between
these two different mechanisms as they produce observationally equivalent patterns
in our data. Instead, we estimate these short-run responses and summarize them
in elasticities, recognizing that this may underrepresent the long run responsiveness,
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particularly for foreseeable spending.
To implement our approach, we need a way of calculating the consumers spot
price, which we model as a response to a cost share. Given that there is no cost
share information for months in which a consumer did not have any spending, using
the actual cost share is not a sufficient strategy without further assumptions about
consumer expectations. Furthermore, our data does not include general plan parame-
ters, such as copayments and deductibles that would allow us to predict what the cost
share would be in the absence of spending. Some way of reflecting price expectations
is needed to fill in all of the missing prices.
We consider two mechanisms of expectations, which likely provide upper and lower
bounds on the relevant spot prices. For the upper bound, we assume backward myopic
expectations, in which a consumer does not know the price until after spending in
a month is complete and cost shares are actually observed (e.g., when the bill is
received in the mail). In this case the price relevant is some previously observed
or assumed cost share, which is a backward-looking framework. We implement this
by using the actual monthly cost share for each subsequent month up until another
month with positive spending occurs, after which the backward myopic cost share is
again revised. In this backward-looking framework, it is easy to define prices after a
visit is made, but an initial price is also needed for each consumer before they make
a visit, including those who never make a visit. Here we make the assumption that
consumers expect that the cost share for their first visit will be the average of the
health plans cost share for all other consumers in their first month of seeking care.
(If we knew the actual features of our health plans, we might assume that the initial
price in a plan with a deductible was one, but our inference approach leads to nearly
that same price.) Specifically, for the backward myopic price, we assign to individuals
the average January cost share of those working for the same employer and under the
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same plan in that year.1
The other price expectations process we model is the forward myopic consumer.
The forward myopic individual not only knows what the cost sharing will be at the
time that services are chosen in a month, but also uses that price to make decisions
prior to that first visit. Hence if consumers first actual visit with a given type of
service happens in March, then we use the actual cost share paid in March for that
service as the price for all months January through March. If the year ends with a
span of one or more months with no visits, we continue the cost share used in the
most recent month for the remainder of the year. To complete this model, we again
need to model expectations for consumers who never make a visit. Specifically, we
impute for all months the January average of those within the same employer and
plan.
Figure 2·1 shows a schematic diagram of how prices are assigned for a hypothetical
person who makes visits in March and September in a plan with a deductible and
followed by stoploss. In panel A, the backward myopic individual made no visits in
January, and hence is assigned the average January cost share. The backward myopic
consumer uses this same cost share for February and March. In March, this individual
obtains care and pays only 75% of the cost, so this new lower cost share is used from
April through September. Finally, in October, the consumer observes the 20% cost
share from the previous month and adjusts accordingly for the remaining of the year.
In panel B, the forward myopic consumer fully anticipates the March spending
even in January. From April onwards, the individual expects the cost share to be
what it turns out to be for September, at 20%. Since no further spending occurs for
the remainder of the year, this same rate is also used as the forward myopic price
through the end of the year. Although the forward myopic consumer is more forward
1If no one in a health plan makes a visit for a given service in January, we drop all people in
that plan for that year for that service since we cannot impute their backward myopic spot prices.
Empirically, this affects only about 0.2% of the sample, mostly for very rarely used services.
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Figure 2·1: Two models of expectations
Note: Shown are the backward myopic and forward myopic expected cost shares for a
single, hypothetical consumer who makes visits only in March and September, and who
experiences an average cost share of .75 in March, and .2 in September. The average cost
share for a person making their first visit in January for this employer*year*plan is assumed
to be .90. The backward myopic consumer uses this price up through March, then lowers
expectations after visits are made in March, and again in October. The forward myopic
consumer anticipates the cost shares in March and September and uses them until new
information comes along.
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looking than the backward myopic consumer, both are myopic in that they are not
forecasting ahead to the end-of-the-year price and instead are using a monthly spot
price. Nonetheless, these two prices provide upper and lower bounds on the actual
spot prices plausible for each month.
2.3.2 Estimation equations
We assume health care spending reflects attributes of the individual (i) (which also
uniquely defines a household contract), employer (e), whether the plan is for a family
or single coverage (f), health plan including its own unique provider network (p),
geographic location such as the county or MSA (c), year (y) and a monthly time
trend index (t). Using Y for the dependent variable, and CS to denote the consumers
cost share (discussed above) relevant for the choice of Y, one strategy would be to
directly estimate the following.
Yit = βCSit + αi + γefpy + δc + λy + γt + εit (2.1)
For this paper we estimate instead the following much simpler specification.
Yit = α
′
iy + βCSit + γt + εit (2.2)
Where α′iy = αi + γefpy + δc + λy.
This equation estimates the relation between spending and cost share controlling
only for individual-year fixed effects and time trend (year-month) fixed-effects, which
has the advantage of speeding up computation. Since including individual-year fixed
effects controls for all of the individual characteristics that do not vary within the year,
we are, in fact, controlling for factors such as age, gender, risk scores, MSA, plans and
any other variables that are fixed within a year. The monthly time dummies pick up
seasonality, changes in national trends, and the effects of any shocks to the economy
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(such as recessions). The only covariate over time (in months) is the individuals
monthly cost share.
We now turn to the issue of functional form, and then instrumental variables.
2.3.3 Functional form
Our dependent variables in model (2) are characterized by a significant fraction of
zero spending and a long right tail, a well-known feature of health care spending
data. To deal with this using annual data, the convention in the literature is to
use the log of annual spending plus one (Aron-Dine et al. 2013, Aron-Dine et al.
2015, Einav et al. 2013, Davis et al. 2016).2 Here we modified the convention of
adding one to accommodate the fact that we are using monthly rather than annual
spending. A priori, we believe using 1/12 makes our results more comparable to
other estimated elasticities modeling annual responsiveness and hence chose that as
our base specification.
For a sensitivity analysis, we estimated models adding an alternative additive
constant within the log specification, a two part model similar to Manning et al.
(1987) and a specification using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (Burbidge
et al. 1988). These results are discussed in Section 2.5 and presented in the appendix.
2.3.4 Instrumental variables
Since cost shares, including our backwards myopic and forward myopic cost shares,
reflect the actual experience of a consumer, they will be endogenous, and using them
in OLS for estimation will lead to biased estimates. For a valid instrument, we need
our instrument to be correlated with this individual price, but uncorrelated with any
demand or supply side shocks that change over time. Note that fixed employer, plan,
2The log linear specification has the added advantage of estimating a nonlinear demand curve
in which the proportional reduction in demand as the cost share is increased by a fixed amount
becomes progressively smaller.
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market or individual characteristics are absorbed by our individual-year fixed effects,
so we are looking for instruments that change during the twelve calendar months. The
previous studies of Eichner (1998) and Kowalski (2016) used exogenous, individual-
level shocks (injuries, and other family member spending decisions) that are time
varying. We use instead the monthly average cost shares for consumers in the same
employer*year*family/single*plan as our instrument. To purge this measure of direct
contamination by a given consumers experience, for each person we use the leave
out one average, which excludes each persons own contribution when calculating the
average. Hence if there are N people in a plan for a given month, we use the average
of the N-1 other people in that plan. This measure is exogenous to the individuals
own decisions, but summarizes well the average time path of cost shares due to
deductibles, coinsurance and copayments within a given plan. F-tests of the power of
our instruments in each first stage regression, which correct for clustered errors, and
are discussed in Section 2.5.
Our IV strategy will lead to unbiased estimates under either of two different
assumptions. One assumption is that all consumers are perfectly backward myopic,
never anticipating the effect of their own spending in the coming month on the cost
share, and hence using a backward view of what the cost share had been in previous
months. A second possible condition for unbiasedness is that there is no biased
selection, so the health, the degree of foresight, and the demand responsiveness mix
of people in every plan is identical. In this case the aggregate average cost share
in a plan will also be uncorrelated with errors affecting the individuals own forward
looking behavior.
If people with more foresight or people who are sicker (i.e., have high risk scores)
and have chronic conditions are anticipating lower cost shares as well as clustering
in more generous health plans, then we should see the average aggregate cost share
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declining with risk scores. The appendix Figure B·1 shows that the average monthly
cost sharing is nearly uniformly distributed across different levels of average risk
scores, suggesting our datas approximation to the second assumption.
In sum, we estimate IV linear regression models using the two forms of myopic
cost shares as our key variables of interest, while including individual-year and time
monthly dummies. We instrument these cost shares with the employer-year-plan leave
out one average cost shares for the corresponding month. Our dependent variable is
log(monthly spending plus 1/12), where 1/12 is chosen to make the elasticity esti-
mates correspond to those from annual data models. Since our model is a log-linear
specification, we calculate elasticities from the regression estimates by multiplying
the estimated price coefficient by the average cost share for that particular service.
Errors are corrected for clustering, assumed to be at the level of the employer-plan-
year. Standard errors for the elasticities are generated using the delta method applied
to the least squares standard errors.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Graphical results
Our identification relies on variation across months in average cost shares as well as
variation across health plans in the benefit coverage offered, which are easy to see
graphically. Figure 2·2 shows patterns of average monthly cost shares by plan type. It
shows the considerable variation across months, across plan types, and across broad
types of service. There is even more heterogeneity in our data in that cost shares
vary across employers and over time, which is averaged out in these diagrams. There
is also considerable heterogeneity within each single plan type. High deductible plans
have the steepest decline in their average cost shares overall, while HMOs have cost
shares that remain basically constant. CDHPs, comprehensive plans, PPOs, and POS
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lie intermediate between the two. Comparing the four panels in the figure, we can see
that outpatient spending shows the steepest decline, closely followed by pharmacy
spending. Inpatient spending shows a relatively modest decline over months, and
is particularly flat for HMOs, as expected since they rely upon supply side controls
more than demand side cost sharing to control costs. One surprise is that HMOs have
a nearly constant and relatively high cost share for pharmacy spending (reflecting a
nearly fixed copayment level) and charge a higher cost share than many other plan
types by December.3
If health care spending is responsive to within-year declines in cost sharing, and
spot prices affect spending, then it must be that spending increases during the year.
And since cost sharing declines more in the HDHPs, CDHPs, and PPOs than other
plan types, this increase should be greater for these plan types than for HMOs. We
are not aware of any previous study that has documented this simple prediction.
Corresponding to the average cost share by plan in Figure 2·2, Figure 2·3 presents
average monthly spending in each of our six plan types. Each diagram pools across
all seven years and all the employers, and since we have a balanced sample with each
person in all twelve months for each year in which they are in our analysis, sample
means capture growth in spending over time.
The immediate pattern in all four plots is that costs are generally increasing in all
plan types except for HMOs, where spending per month is nearly flat over time. The
lowest line by December in every figure is the one for the HMOs, which is just below
that of HDHPs. The line for CDHPs more or less follows the pattern of HDHP, low
but strongly increasing. At the other extreme, costs are highest for the comprehensive
health plan, which does not manage care, and also has the oldest enrollees and lowest
average cost share. PPO spending is generally second highest, but also growing
3We speculate, but have not looked into the possibility, that HMOs do a better job at steering
their enrollees toward generic drugs, so that even though the cost is lower, the share of drug costs
is higher in HMOs than in plans that permit a greater use of branded drugs.
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Figure 2·2: Average monthly cost share by plan type, 2008-2014
Note: Each panel plots the average actual cost share for the services indicated by month,
averaged over the seven year period for each plan type for the 73 employer sample. People
not using a service in the month are excluded.
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Figure 2·3: Average monthly spending by plan type, 2008-2014
Note: Each panel plots the monthly spending for the services indicated by month, averaged
over the seven year period for each plan type for the 73 employer sample. People not using
a service in the month are included as zero spending.
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Figure 2·4: Cost share imputations for HMOs, PPOs and HDHPs by
Type of Service
Note: Each panel shows the actual, backward myopic, and forward myopic cost shares
for three plan types: HMOs, PPOs, and HDHPs. The four panels correspond to All,
Outpatient, Inpatient and Pharmacy spending.
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meaningfully over time.
The remaining panels of Figure 2·3 illustrate that mean costs are also noticeably
increasing for outpatient spending and pharmaceutical spending. Spending growth is
decidedly lower for inpatient spending, consistent with the slower changing monthly
pattern for inpatient cost sharing, yet an upward trend in HDHP is still evident.
Figure 2·4 shows empirically the difference in the imputation methodology for
three categories of services and three different plan types HMO, PPO, and HDHP.
HDHPs and HMOs are on opposite ends of the spectrum of the monthly cost share
variation. Indeed, since the average cost sharing in HMOs is nearly constant from
the beginning to the end of the year, the variation is nearly zero, making the im-
putations very close to the actual values. In sharp contrast, HDHPs have sharply
declining actual, backwards and forward myopic prices. Both the backward and for-
ward myopic prices are above the actual values for most of the year. This reflects the
mass of individuals that never make a visit and therefore always have a high price
expectation. This is particularly striking in the case of inpatient spending, where cost
share imputations are nearly constant over time and shows very little variation across
the year. The lack of monthly variation within a plan in inpatient cost sharing is a
precursor of why we find it difficult to estimate the impact of cost share on inpatient
categories such as room and board, and other service categories with precision even
in our extremely large sample.
2.4.2 Regression results
Table 2.2 presents the IV results from estimating model (2) on overall spending, on
three broad categories of service (outpatient, inpatient, and prescription drugs), and
on 22 finer, not mutually exhaustive, categories of spending, using employer mean cost
shares for a month as the instrument. Separate estimates are presented for backward
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and forward myopic cost shares models.4 The overall demand elasticity is estimated
to be -0.44 using the backward myopic cost share expectations and -0.41 for forward
myopic cost share expectations, which are plausible and consistent with much of the
previous literature.5
The next three rows of Table 2.2 show heterogeneity between outpatient, inpa-
tient and pharmacy claims. Our model estimates nearly identical elasticities of -0.29
(backward myopic) and -0.28 (forward myopic) models. Pharmacy is more elastic, at
-0.44 (backward myopic) and -0.51 (forward myopic). Einav et al. (2018) estimate
a mean drug elasticity of -0.24 for a Medicare Part D, a population older than our
sample.6 Inpatient spending is estimated to have a statistically significant elasticity
of -0.30 using the backward myopic price versus an implausible -2.35 for the forward
myopic price. This instability is a symptom of almost all of estimates of elasticities
for relatively rare, inpatient-based services: elasticities are often implausibly large
and generally imprecise. As previously pointed out, we believe this occurs because
our IV approach fails to find a meaningful within-year variation in prices for these
services, which happens invariably when mean monthly spending on a category is
high and almost invariably puts a person over their deductible and stoploss. This is
a particular problem for the forward myopic prices, so for the most part we focus on
the backward myopic results in the remainder of this section.
The remaining rows of Table 2.2 illustrate elasticities for various services of inter-
est. Emergency room (ER) spending has an extremely low elasticity of -0.04 using
4We conducted F-tests of the significant of our first stage instruments, and the minimum F-
statistic was 14.65 in the backward myopic specification and 9.03 in the forward myopic specification,
with most values greater than 50. Results are presented in Table B.3
5Kowalski (2016) uses a different IV approach to estimate the overall demand elasticity of -1.49
at the median percentile.
6They also estimate an overall drug elasticity of -0.037. However, this elasticity is defined as the
probability of filling a claim for any drug, while ours is defined in terms of spending, which also
reflects substitution effects between drugs. For this reason, our estimates are more comparable to
their mean drug elasticity, which allows for substitution.
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Table 2.2: IV regression results showing demand responses to two
types of cost share
Backward myopic cost share Forward myopic cost share
Model: log(1/12 + Y) Coefficient Elasticity S.E Coefficient Elasticity S.E
All Spending -1.26 -0.44 0.044 -1.26 -0.41 0.041
Outpatient -0.86 -0.29 0.034 -0.91 -0.28 0.033
Inpatient -2.18 -0.30 0.045 -17.37 -2.35 0.357
Pharmaceutical -1.00 -0.44 0.040 -1.12 -0.51 0.045
Maternity -0.27 -0.09 0.042 -0.39 -0.12 0.060
MH/SA -0.62 -0.26 0.046 -0.93 -0.39 0.069
ER -0.12 -0.04 0.024 -0.51 -0.17 0.102
Room and Board -1.44 -0.20 0.069 -8.18 -1.14 0.389
Non specialty visits -0.73 -0.25 0.041 -0.90 -0.28 0.046
Home visits -0.06 -0.01 0.071 -0.25 -0.05 0.326
Prevention -0.34 -0.02 0.009 -4.86 -0.29 0.123
Surgical procedures 1.33 0.07 0.098 28.85 1.52 2.139
Surgical supplies/devices -3.13 -0.22 0.090 -80.88 -5.76 2.318
Specialty visits -0.80 -0.32 0.033 -1.10 -0.42 0.043
Dialysis 0.17 0.02 0.156 0.31 0.04 0.290
PT, OT, speech therapy -0.33 -0.15 0.032 -0.60 -0.27 0.057
Chiropractic -0.36 -0.23 0.065 -0.47 -0.30 0.083
CAT scans -0.49 -0.15 0.023 -2.64 -0.80 0.123
Mammograms -1.02 -0.11 0.027 -19.92 -1.97 0.499
MRIs -0.95 -0.29 0.022 -7.30 -2.21 0.171
PET scans -1.13 -0.17 0.081 -7.35 -1.13 0.528
Radiology - diagnostic -0.42 -0.15 0.018 -1.09 -0.38 0.044
Ultrasounds -0.38 -0.14 0.015 -1.54 -0.56 0.060
Diagnostic services -0.53 -0.15 0.021 -1.54 -0.42 0.059
DME -0.39 -0.18 0.038 -1.00 -0.47 0.097
Ambulances -0.31 -0.07 0.052 -4.75 -1.00 0.806
Note: N = 170,963,286 individual months. Each row is a different regression using the
log(spending plus 1/12) as the dependent variable. Each model includes individual*year
fixed effects, 12 monthly time dummies and uses employers average cost share for that
year*plan*family*month, without the own individual, as an instrument. Cluster corrected stan-
dard errors use the employer*plan for clusters. Elasticities are evaluated at the mean cost share
for that particular type of service, and S.E obtained using the delta method.
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backward myopic prices, as does maternity (-0.09), consistent with our expectations.
Demand response for mental health and substance abuse (MH/SA) services are of
intermediate elasticities (-0.26). This may reflect the current trend that most peo-
ple getting professional mental health treatment are getting drugs only or receiving
MH/SA treatment in primary care (McGuire 2016), which is consistent with the low
level of spending on specialty mental health care observed in our data. Surgical pro-
cedures and Dialysis, two very expensive types of services, are of the wrong sign and
not statistically different from zero. Other relatively inelastic services (with backward
myopic elasticities below -0.1) are prevention and ambulance transport.
Although 171 million observations seems like a very large sample, for infrequently
used but expensive services it remains difficult to precisely measure demand response.
Table 2.1 helps identify the services with very low rates of positive spending but
high conditional spending: home visits, dialysis, and inpatient surgical procedures
are examples of this with high standard errors. Most people with spending on these
types of service are likely to be associated with high annual spending, and thus exceed
any reasonable deductible or stoploss, and face very little price variation. This is also
a good argument for why cost sharing on such services will be an ineffective cost
containment tool, since it imposes financial risk with little effect on spending on
these services.
Our methodology may also not be reliable for services that are highly chronic since
myopic spot prices may be less appropriate. Consider drugs, goods, and services such
as statins (for high blood pressure), insulin, oxygen, home health visits for the chroni-
cally ill, and long term behavioral, physical, and occupational therapies. Spending on
these services is highly predictable for many patients, and when expensive, consumers
can readily foresee exceeding their deductibles. Our approach may nonetheless have
some power, since even users of these services may have surprises about other types
66
of spending that affect cost shares. Nonetheless, overall our approach will be less
reliable for persistent types of spending.
2.5 Extensions and sensitivity analysis
In this section, we re-estimate the model on various partitions of our sample to con-
sider whether demand response is higher or lower for certain identifiable groups. Since
estimated elasticities are sensitive to the average cost shares in each subgroup, which
can vary dramatically, we present here only the estimates of the demand curve co-
efficients on all subgroups, making them comparable. We then conduct a number
of sensitivity analyses, examine the robustness of our IVs, and consider alternative
functional forms. All of this analysis focuses on the backward myopic formulation of
prices.
2.5.1 Demand responses by selected subsamples
In this section, we examine price coefficients (not elasticities) of total spending and
our three broad groups of services for various subgroups of our sample. Table 2.3
presents the results of our analysis using five different partitions of the individual-
years in our estimation sample using the backward myopic price formulation. In
broad terms, our data imply the following conclusions. Males and females are not
statistically significantly different. Spending on children is less elastic than spending
on adults. Pharmacy demand became more elastic from 2008 to 2014. Adults in single
versus family contracts are similar in their demand responsiveness, but children are
less price responsive. Enrollees at HMOs are less price responsive than enrollees in
HDHP for outpatient spending but not pharmacy spending. This last finding about
pharmacy has implications for the work of Brot-Goldberg et al. (2017) which focused
on changes in demand from a firm that significantly raised its deductibles, and found
relatively large demand elasticities. This result is also consistent with the results of
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Einav et al. (2015) who document heterogeneity in Medicare pharmacy demand.
Table 2.3: Estimated demand coefficients by demographic and plan
subgroups
Model: log(1/12 + Y), backward myopia expectations, IV results
% of sample All spending Outpatient Inpatient Pharmacy
Benchmark 100 -1.26 -0.86 -2.18 -1.00
Gender
Male 48.50 -1.29 -0.83 -1.69 -1.02
Female 51.50 -1.24 -0.88 -2.48 -0.99
Age group
0 to 5 6.39 -0.56 -0.25 -2.03 -0.68
6 to 20 23.67 -0.88 -0.41 -1.19 -0.97
21 to 45 34.87 -1.37 -0.91 -2.90 -0.92
46 to 64 35.07 -1.49 -1.14 -1.82 -1.09
Plan type
HMO 9.97 -1.49 -0.59 0.34 -1.15
PPO 65.51 -1.17 -0.74 -2.59 -0.74
HDHP 1.82 -1.39 -1.34 -3.34 -1.17
Time period
2008-2009 30.67 -0.81 -0.52 -1.98 -0.33
2010-2012 49.74 -1.41 -1.08 -1.98 -1.03
2013-2014 19.59 -1.07 -0.70 -1.95 -1.22
Plan coverage
Single 21.11 -1.47 -1.04 -0.93 -1.13
Family, employee 25.26 -1.61 -1.16 -2.59 -1.08
Family, spouse 19.95 -1.37 -1.01 -2.90 -0.98
Family, child 33.68 -0.83 -0.40 -1.80 -0.89
Note: Table shows the unconditional estimated demand coefficients for all services and for
three broad types of services by gender, age grup, risk score ranges, selected plan types,
time interval and plan coverage. Each coefficient is from a different IV regression. Each IV
regression includes individual*year fixed effects and 12 monthly time dummies and uses
employer’s average cost share for that service in that year*plan*family*month as an in-
strument for the myopic cost share. Dependent variable is log of spending on that service
plus one. Cluster corrected standard errors use the employer*plan for clusters.
Table 2.4 shows the results by various employment-related groups. We find the
following. Enrollees working at a firm in transportation, communications, or utilities
have the least price responsive demand curves. Hourly, non-union employees are less
responsive than other salary classes. Enrollees in low cost sharing firms have more
inelastic demand than those in high cost sharing firms. Demand is less responsive in
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firms with over 200,000 employees than in firms with 5,000 to 49,999.
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We present this summary of the effects of cost sharing on diverse population and
employer subgroups without attempting to interpret them, primarily as examples of
the power of using a readily available instrument in large samples to explore differences
in such dimensions. Studies using only survey data or a single employer will not have
the power to address such refined issues that may nonetheless be of considerable
policy interest.
2.5.2 Robustness of IVs
One concern about our IV is that cost shares are correlated with the degree of con-
sumer foresight. We therefore generated and examined appendix Figure B·1 for all
spending and for our three broad categories of service. The horizontal axis plots
intervals of prospective DxCG relative risk scores (RRS) for each person based on
prior-year diagnostic information. Here the highest value RRS correspond to being
seven times the average spending, while the lowest RRS interval is .1, which is only
10 percent of the population average. The analysis reveals that as expected the back-
wards myopic and forward myopic prices have a sharp downward slope: sicker people
are more likely to exceed any deductibles or stoplosses and pay lower cost shares.
But the modestly downward slope for the employer mean actual cost share suggests
that overall there is only a weak correlation between our instrument and the average
health status of enrollees: The slight downward slope does suggest that enrollees who
are sicker tend to work at firms that on average have more generous coverage, so that
their average cost share is slightly lower than the population average. Ideally there
would be no relationship between the leave out one mean cost shares and the RRS.
The modest relationship observed implies that our estimated demand elasticities will
be slightly too high rather than too low. We interpret this analysis as saying that
our IV strategy is strong, although not perfect.
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2.5.3 Alternative functional forms
Appendix Table B.5 reports our estimates using the alternative specification of log(Y+1).
Among statistically significant elasticities, using log(Y+1) instead of log(Y+1/12) re-
duces the elasticities by 20.8 to 38.1 percent.
We also estimated results using a two-part model ( Manning et al. 1987), in which
the first stage models the binary choice of seeking care and the second stage models
the continuous choice of how much treatment to obtain. Given that we rely on a
very large number of individual-year fixed effects for identification, non-linear models
such as logit or selection models are unattractive or infeasible. Results using a lin-
ear probability model are presented in appendix Table B.6. The resulting elasticity
estimates are less stable (especially on rarely used services), which we speculate is
because the linear probability model does extremely poorly when outcome probabil-
ities are very close to zero. The conditional spending results (appendix Table B.7)
predicting log(spending) are also problematic, with both positive and negative price
effects detected, as can be expected given the large selection effects at the first stage.
In addition to our log linear and two part models, we also estimate results using
the inverse hyperbolic sine function ( Burbidge et al. 1988), which provides a different
way to accommodate zero spending together with a thick long tail (Table B.4). We
find that results are not very different from our initial specification and choose to
keep the log model as our preferred specification due to its simplicity.
In sum, we tried three alternative model specifications to our preferred model,
and did not find any of them to be preferable. Clearly, finding better specifications
for modeling extremely skewed data with a preponderance of zeros using fixed effect
methods remains an area needing further research.
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2.6 Conclusions
This paper develops a new IV approach for estimating demand responsiveness using
big data and highly disaggregated types of service. We document and take advantage
of the considerable within-year variation in cost shares in many health plan types,
which when combined with plans that have flat cost sharing creates a nice setting for
estimation of demand elasticities. It seems not to be widely recognized that downward
cost sharing trends during the calendar year must imply upward spending trends on
services if there are unexpected spending shocks, or consumers are myopic. We show
that these patterns are strong across many types of service, showing that within-year
price responsiveness is significant. We acknowledge that our results represent only
US employees working at large firms, but our estimates improve on those coming
from only a single large employer. Our results suggest that studies using only a single
employer, or using only people who are in high deductible plans may not generalize
since they are not representative of the full population of privately insured.
Our IV strategy leads to elasticity estimates that are plausible and consistent with
other estimates from the literature for services where a single month of use does not
typically put a person over normal deductible levels. Our IV approach works less
well for expensive procedures like hospice care, inpatient surgery, room and board
spending, and dialysis, where the time of the year matters less since the consumer
will almost invariably exceed the deductible. While not perfect, our IV has the
advantage of being widely available and easy to use. OLS estimates, in contrast are
often in the wrong sign.
An innovation of the paper is that we estimate two different forms of spot prices:
backward myopic prices where consumers never anticipate future spending, and for-
ward myopic spot prices, where they fully anticipate actual spending in the current
when making consumption decisions. We find relatively modest differences in our
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elasticities once we ignore statistically insignificant ones. One hypothesis for this is
that our two measures are highly correlated when consumers use a service multiple
times per year, and since we use an IV strategy, it corrects for expectation errors.
Our approach holds great promise in potentially providing a new instrument em-
ployer average monthly cost share on a service of interest which can be used in other
studies looking for an instrument for rates of spending or utilization of a service. For
example, consider procedure ABC, lab test DEF, or drug GHI that are sometimes
used only for a patient with condition 123. If consumers are diagnosed with condition
123 at different times in the year, and face changing cost shares over time, then our
approach can be used to generate a reasonable instrument for assessing the effective-
ness of each of these procedures, tests, or drugs for treating condition 123. Given
how valuable it is to have good instruments, other uses may prove to be as useful as
the estimates of demand response that we generate here.
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Chapter 3
Doctors’ Response to Queues: Evidence
from a Portuguese Emergency
Department
This chapter is joint work with Luis Filipe.
3.1 Introduction
Hospital Emergency Departments (ED) are infamous for operating consistently over
capacity, with long queues leading to waiting times that can last several hours. Pa-
tients’ arrivals to the ED pose an externality onto each other since they decrease
the amount of resources available for other patients. This externality can potentially
lead to negative health outcomes for patients, either because their medical condition
worsens while waiting to be seen by a physician, or because there are fewer resources
available for their diagnosis and treatment. Policy-makers and managers have the
difficult task of assigning capacity limits (in terms of physical and human capital) to
hospitals, requiring them to balance the potential health consequences of peak-load
times and the opportunity cost of capital under idle times.
In order to cope with peaks in visits to the ED, doctors are faced with a choice
between rationing their time and use of diagnosis/treatment instruments and allowing
for waiting times to increase. Moreover, equal rationing for all patients is not ideal
due to differences in urgency between arriving patients. For example, a patient with a
heart attack might require the same treatment, regardless of a peak in visits, while a
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patient with a common cold can spare some of the time spent with the doctor, which
releases some resources to be used for other patients.
In this paper, we ask how do physicians respond to the level of visits in the ED,
in the context of a Portuguese public hospital. We study responses in three different
aspects. First, we analyze the time spent during visits, i.e., length of stay (defined as
the time between being called to see the doctor for a first time and being discharged
from treatment). Second, we look at the intensity of the use of lab tests, exams and
treatment procedures (which we proxy with the out-of-pocket payment (OOP) due
to the institutional context of our setting). In the two previous aspects we analyze
the differential effect of doctors’ response to the urgency of episodes, as measured by
the Manchester Triage System. Third, we study the doctors’ choice of destination
upon discharging patients.
We use visit-level data for one ED in the Lisbon area, between January 2011
and October 2012, to construct the waiting queue for an individual patient based on
timestamps for several milestones within an ED visit. We leverage on a fixed-effects
model to exploit very fine variations in queue size which happens within a specific
hour, thus controlling flexibly for within-day variation, as well as weekly and monthly
seasonality and yearly trends. We control for the endogeneity of the queue by using
the number of arrivals to the ED in past sixty minutes as an instrument. Visits to
the ED have often been used in the literature as a source of exogenous variation in
health expenditures (Eichner 1998, Kowalski 2016)
Literature on doctors’ behavior mostly looks at reactions to pecuniary incentives,
analyzing the supply of medical care under different payment mechanisms, based on
the seminal work by Ellis and McGuire (1986).1 However, doctors’ behavior in the
absence of financial incentives is a less explored issue. Without financial incentives,
1A brief overview of policy reforms that change physicians payment mechanisms can be found in
Chandra et al. (2011) or Mcclellan (2011).
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the factors which influence physicians’ degree of agency are more limited, and roughly
summarized into sense of duty, altruism (Kolstad 2013, Godager and Wiesen 2013)
and pressure placed upon them by the hospital management boards, their peers (Chan
2016, Silver 2016) or their patients.
Studies argue that time constraints drive doctors to optimize based on a time-
quality trade-off (Anand et al. 2011, Dugdale et al. 1999), which has direct effects on
the delivery of health care. These choices are important, as time spent with patients
is related to positive health outcomes (Ogden et al. 2004, Chen 2009, Silver 2016)
while time waiting for treatment is associated with undesirable events (Sivey (2017),
Baker et al. 1991, Bindman et al. 1991).
We aim at contributing to the literature by empirically testing the hypothesis
that doctors are aware and react to the number of patients waiting in the ED. We
determine the channels on which they leverage and discuss potential effects on health
outcomes. The ED is an interesting context to study this hypothesis given that
patients wait for care at the facility and queues cannot be extended for many hours,
creating extra pressure on doctors to react to congestion. More, Portuguese ED
provide a perfect setting to study net of financial incentives decisions, due to fixed
remuneration of physicians. The richness of our data allows us to leverage on very
fine fixed effects that control for several unobservables that would otherwise bias
estimates using aggregated data. The literature so far has focused on waiting lists
where this pressure does not exist, such as elective surgery (Riganti et al. 2017) or
elective admissions (Siciliani et al. 2009). We lean on the results to argue that, in the
presence of resource constraints, and assuming a concave patients’ utility function,
doctors reduce the quality of treatment when marginal benefits of treatment are low.
Our work is closely related to Sivey (2017) and Gruber et al. (2018). Sivey (2017)
evaluate the consequences of waiting times on the demand-side, studying specifically
77
how likely consumers are to exit the waiting room without treatment when waiting
times increase. Our paper is a complement, in the sense that we use a similar setting
but rather answer the supply-side question of doctors’ behavior. Gruber et al. (2018)
study how waiting times in emergency departments in the UK lead to changes in the
probability of admission and mortality. They show that a decrease in waiting times
leads to a decrease in mortality. Gruber et al. (2018) establish that doctor’s actions
have serious consequences for patients’ health status (a number of other studies have
correlated waiting times with patient mortality, as summarized by Hoot and Aronsky
2008). Therefore, while we do not have data that allows us to assess mortality,
assessing doctors’ behavior is an important mechanism with important consequences.
In our analysis, we show the relation between queues and waiting times, to assess
whether there is a channel through which physicians’ attempts at decreasing queues
impact waiting times, and consequently their associated negative outcomes.
Our results show that doctors react to increasing visits to the emergency depart-
ment in several dimensions. First, they spend less time with patients. Indeed, a 1%
increase in the number of patients waiting leads to a 0.41% decrease in length of stay.
Furthermore, there is evidence of externalities across patients of different urgency de-
grees, in the sense that doctors decrease length of stay for a given patient when there
is an increase in the queue of different urgency levels, suggesting that patients put
pressure on resources across the board. Second, they decrease costs of diagnosis and
treatment (implying lower intensity). In addition, we find that the lower intensity is
driven by the extensive margin, that is, whether patients are sent to any care further
than the doctor visit, and not the intensive margin. Finally, doctors are more likely
to refer patients to primary care facilities or send them home rather than admitting
them to inpatient care.
We find mixed evidence of heterogeneity in the impact by arrival urgency. In fact,
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an increase in the number of visits leads to a larger decrease in the length of stay
in the ED for patients who had a non urgent visit than for those with a very urgent
visit. However, this heterogeneity is not present in terms of costs of treatment and
diagnosis.
Despite not being able to assess health outcomes, our paper has important policy
implications. Understanding doctors’ reactions to queues in emergency departments
is the first step for policy markers to design mechanisms aiming at achieving optimal
outcomes. For example, policy makers aiming at reducing congestion face impor-
tant indirect costs. Our results suggest that doctors use more resources per patient
as queues decrease, which could increase the financial costs for payers, such as a
National Health Service. In addition, our paper also suggests a positive correlation
between the utilization of hospitals and primary care centers. A peak in admissions
to hospitals increases admission at primary care centers, as doctors substitute their
patients between the two. Therefore, choosing capacity for each type of care facility
must be a joint decision that accounts for the positive correlation.
We start by providing a description of the institutional context of the Portuguese
health care system that guides our analysis in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3 we describe
the data and how we define our main variables of interest. In Section 3.4 we present
our empirical strategy and discuss identification. Section 3.5 presents our main re-
sults, while Section 3.6 focuses on robustness checks to further support our findings.
Finally, we conclude in Section 3.7.
3.2 Institutional Context
The Portuguese health care system is primarily characterized by a universal National
Health Service (NHS), that is regulated at the federal level. A comprehensive de-
scription of the Portuguese health care system can be found in Barros et al. (2011).
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The NHS is designed such that each individual has an assigned gatekeeper (family
doctor) that serves as the point of entry to obtain health care. However, patients often
face delays between visiting the gatekeeper and obtaining access to specialty care. For
this reason, it’s common for patients to bypass the intended referral mechanism by
going straight to the ED, where they can obtain all specialty care (including lab tests
and exams) in a single day. Because of this, many visits to the emergency department
are, in fact, not true medical emergencies.
Visiting the ED is not free to the patient; there is a small flat access charge that
is meant to prevent excessive use of the ED and is not a sizable source of revenue.
Moreover, there is also a co-payment for any additional lab test, exam or treatment
procedure the patient takes, which are typically unknown to patients until the bill is
received at the end of the visit. The access charge does not seem to be successful at
preventing inappropriate use (Barros et al. 2011). This is in line with recent research
showing that individuals are not price sensitive with respect to emergency visits (see
Duarte 2012 or Ellis et al. 2017).
Between 2011 and 2012 (our sample period) the billing system changed. In 2011,
the access charge was e 9.60. The OOP was a direct mapping from each specific
service to a co-payment, comprised of hundreds of types of services (for example, the
OOP for an X-Ray was e 1.80 and for an Magnetic Resonance Imaging procedure
was e 21.50).
In 2012 the access charge more than doubled, increasing to e 20. For the diagnosis
and treatment procedures, the OOP was defined as a piecewise mapping between the
price of the service and a co-payment (e.g., procedures that cost between e 60 and
e 64.99 have an OOP of e 12). This means that, in 2012, more expensive procedures
have a weakly higher co-payment.
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3.3 Data and Summary Statistics
We make use of visits-level data of one hospital in the Lisbon area between Jan-
uary 2011 and October 2012. All visits occurring within that period are recorded
electronically in the hospital information system.
For each visit, we observe several time stamps. In particular, we observe the time
(detailed to the second) in which a patient checks in, starts and finishes the triage,
is called to be seen by a doctor for the first time, is discharged by the doctor and
checks out from the ED. We present a schematic time-line in Figure 3·1, along with
the median time patients spend in each one.
Figure 3·1: Arrivals time-line
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Note: Figure shows a typical visit to the emergency department, divided into the
several milestones that are present in the data.
In order to observe doctors’ behavior, we construct our main outcome of interest
from the time stamps available in our data. We define patient length of stay (LOS)
as the time between the patient being summoned to see a doctor for the first time
until she gets discharged.2 In a standard visit, length of stay is a combination of four
factors that happen in the following sequence: The patient first sees a nurse, then
waits in office to see the doctor. The doctor may or may not send the patient for
further testing at the hospital, which leads to the patient further waiting to get the
testing done, in addition to the time taking it. After this, the patient needs to wait
to see the doctor again. Length of stay is a term usually applied to time spent in
2We do not observe any other time stamps within that interval.
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inpatient care. However, in our framework, it represents the time a patient spends
under treatment/diagnosis (within the caveats of measurement explained above) in
an outpatient setting. This notation is the same used in Chan (2016).
In Table 3.1, as well as in Figure C·1, we describe our main dependent variables.
The table shows that waiting times are decreasing in urgency, while out of pocket
is increasing. The relationship between length of stay and urgency, however, is not
monotonic. For example, visits with an urgency level of Red have a substantial lower
length of stay then Orange visits, both at the average and the median. This fact
can be explained by the fact that Red visits might be not fully treated at the ED.
Instead, such patients are stabilized in the ED, and then sent to the intensive care
unit. Moreover, these patients are also more likely to die in the ED, thus shortening
their length of stay. The median value for the length of stay is well below the mean,
showing the data is highly skewed to the right. To account for this, we analyze this
variable in logarithmic terms.
Length of stay in our data includes a waiting period that patients face after seeing
the doctor and are sent for extra exams and lab tests. This waiting period while
being treated is weakly positively correlated with visits to the ED, as more people
are waiting for additional testing. For this reason, we expect our estimate to be a
lower bound on the true doctors’ response. Therefore, a higher number of arrivals to
the ED might increase total length of stay, even if doctors decrease time spend with
the patient.
To evaluate whether doctors’ change decisions regarding the intensity of treat-
ment, tests and exams, when dealing with higher queues, we use patient out-of-pocket
payments.3. This variable is used given the absence of data about the services the
patients benefited from. One feature of the payment system in Portuguese emergency
rooms is that the OOP is increasing with the costs of procedures. Therefore, we can
3We observe the out of pocket the patient was charged regardless of whether she paid or not.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Blue Green Yellow Orange Red All
Observations 3,098 151,980 103,117 16,710 1,374 276,279
Length of Stay Mean 139.06 128.90 274.56 465.82 353.49 204.87
SD 951.31 345.38 539.33 737.63 644.57 478.08
Median 32.68 50.27 139.30 270.07 126.72 84.62
Waiting time Mean 103.58 62.59 42.67 21.64 20.83 52.93
SD 140.67 135.96 88.62 24.30 26.98 116.38
Median 46.89 35.37 28.07 16.47 15.38 30.37
Out of Pocket Mean 14.23 16.50 21.88 28.97 37.72 19.34
SD 8.27 9.68 14.67 21.38 42.17 13.55
Median 9.60 15.55 20.00 23.80 21.21 20.00
Queue Mean 0.48 10.16 4.15 0.20 0.03 14.58
SD 0.78 8.18 4.01 0.48 0.16 10.98
Median 0.00 8.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 12.00
Note: Triage colors are sorted by increasing urgency level ranking from left to right. Length
of stay is the number of minutes between being first seen by the doctor and discharge; OOP
is the out-of-pocket payment of the visit to the ED; Queue is the number of people in the
waiting room at the time a patient is called to see the doctor. Results use a total of 276,061
arrivals in the emergency department of a Lisbon hospital, from Jan 2011-Oct 2012.
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use the out of pocket as a signal for doctors’ intensity of use of treatments and di-
agnosis instruments. This allows us to evaluate to what extent changes in length of
stay due to congestion are driven by doctors’ decisions regarding the use of resources.
As explained in Section 3.2, the monotonic mapping between OOP and the cost of
treatment is only guaranteed in 2012. Therefore, for the OOP analysis we use only
data for 2012.
We show in Figure 3·2 the distribution of the OOP variable. The three bunching
points correspond to the value of the access charge. In 2011, this was e 9.6, although
patients over 65 years old receive a 50% discount, which corresponds to the e 4.8
bunching point seen in the figure. In 2012, the access charge was e 20. Deviations
to this amount correspond to extra lab tests, exams or treatments that patients took
during their visit to the ED. Because we use Year-Month-Day-Hour fixed effects, the
difference in the access charge between 2011 and 2012 does not affect our estimates.
Upon medical discharge, we observe where the patient is referred to. However, the
number of deaths in our dataset is noticeably low, at 0.19%. This happens because
a patient in a critical health status is only stabilized in the ED, and then admitted
to the intensive care unit. Therefore, we cannot study death probabilities from our
data. Studying readmission episodes is also unfeasible since patients may decide to
visit primary care centers or other nearby hospitals in case of relapse.
Our dataset has results of the triage, using the Manchester Triage System (MTS),
where each patient is given a color code that represents the ex-ante urgency of the
visit. There are 5 color codes, that can be seen in Table 3.1, ranked increasingly
in urgency level.4 The MTS is an algorithm that triage nurses follow in order to
determine the urgency of the visit. The algorithm includes major symptoms and
further narrow down additional signs ranked by priority. Zachariasse et al. (2017)
4There is also an additional color code, white, that corresponds to patients who were referred
from another doctor and, therefore, the color does not directly represent urgency. We exclude these
referrals, which represent 3.2% of our sample.
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Figure 3·2: Out-of-pocket distribution
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Note: The out-of-pocket is the amount, in euros, that a patient is
charged upon discharge from the hospital. The bunching points rep-
resent the value of the access charge to be seen at the emergency
department, which is e 9.6Euro in 2011, and 20Euro in 2012. Values
below 9.6 are a 50% discount that patients over 65 years old receive
in 2011. Values are truncated at e 50 for readability.
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show, using information from a Lisbon-area hospital, that the MTS in Portugal is a
good, but not perfect, predictor of urgency level. In our data, it is noticeable that
more urgent cases (yellow, orange and red) spend longer times under treatment. The
skewness of length of stay is a pattern that is consistent across urgency levels. The
OOP for patients that arrived under a more urgent condition is also higher, suggesting
that these patients use diagnosis and treatment services more intensively.
Figure 3·3: Distribution of the queue
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Note: Queue is defined as the number of people waiting in the
emergency department at the time a patient is called for treat-
ment for the first time.
We use the time stamps of each arrival to define the queue. For each visit, we
create a tally of the total number of patients waiting in the ED at the time the patient
is called to see the doctor for the first time. The assumption on doctors’ behavior is
that this information is available to them, that is, doctors are able to estimate how
many people are waiting at a given point in time.
The distribution of the overall congestion variable can be seen in Figure 3·3.
Figure C·2, in the online appendix, shows the distribution of the color-specific queue,
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separately for each type of visit, as measured by the triage. More specifically, each
panel uses a subset of the visits based on their triage color and shows the queue
distribution of the same color. For example, the panel labeled as “Blue” takes all the
visits with a Blue-level urgency and shows the distribution of the number of people
waiting that also had a Blue urgency.
Figure 3·4: Hourly distribution of main variables
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Note: Arrivals correspond to the number of patients arriving at
the hospital. Waiting is the number of minutes between arrival
to the hospital and being called to see the doctor. Length of
stay is the number of minutes between being first seen by the
doctor and discharge. Queue is defined as the number of people
waiting in the emergency department at the time a patient is
called for treatment for the first time.
Figure 3·4 provides further statistics, showing the daily distributions of arrivals,
waiting times, queues and length of stay. We observe that arrivals, waiting times and
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queues have similar patterns, increasing during the morning, reaching their peaks in
the afternoon, decreasing latter in the evening and maintaining low levels during the
night. Regarding length of stay, there is a clear difference between night, morning
and afternoon/evening. Nocturne periods present the highest values, while after-
noon/evening get the medium and morning the the lowest. Those values are most
likely being driven by supply side factors (e.g. number of specialized physicians).
Table C.1 shows the summary statistics separated by color urgency level.
Finally, we observe age and gender of the patients, which allows to control for
patient characteristics known to be correlated with general health status. In our
sample, the average age is 53.66 years old and the percentage of female patients is
53.21%.
Unfortunately, we do not observe any supply variables. For instance, we do not
observe the the identity of which doctor worked on each visit, nor how many doctors
are working at each period of the day. Differences in doctor characteristics - such as
specialties, age, gender or how altruistic they are - can be correlated with the type
of treatment that each patient receives, but our data does not allow us to control for
physicians fixed effects. For this reason, our identification relies on using year-month-
day-hour fixed effects to exploit only variation in a single hour, where the number
of doctors is fixed, and which controls for selection of doctors into shifts at different
hours.
3.4 Methodology
We evaluate doctors’ behavior along four different dimensions. The first is the length
of stay and looks at the total time patients spend under treatment, which is a com-
bination of both time spent with the doctor, time spent with the nurse and time
spent in diagnosis. In the second we use the OOP payment of the visit as a proxy for
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intensity of diagnosis and treatment procedures. In the third we look at what is the
discharge target of patients.
3.4.1 Length of Stay
Our analysis aims at evaluating the impact that the ED queue has on the doctors’
choice of length of stay. To do this, we start with the following basic specification.
Length of Stayist = βQueueit + γXist + τt + εist (3.1)
Where Length of Stayist is the total time that patient in visit i, with urgency degree
s, in time (hour) t spends on treatment, and Queueit is a measure of how crowded the
ED waiting room is. The vector Xit includes a set of patient characteristics at the
time of visit i, comprised by age, gender, age-gender interaction and urgency level of
the visit as measured by the triage color. We include the interaction of fixed effects
at the level of year-month-day-hour, τt. Therefore, we are exploiting a very fine level
of variation in congestion occurring at a specific hour across almost two years of data.
Finally, εit is the idiosyncratic error.
We are primarily interested in the coefficient β, which measures the impact of an
increase in the queue on the time spent under treatment. We defined visit i’s queue
as the number of patients waiting to be seen at the time the patient is called to see
the doctor for the first time. Since patients’ waiting time often exceeds one hour,
the queue for a given patient includes people who arrived at a different hour in the
past. Moreover, people who are called to see the doctor in the same hour may have
different queues due to, for example, arrivals between the minute in which they were
called. As an illustrative example, if there are 20 people waiting in at 5:35pm, when
patients A sees a doctor for the first time, then the queue patient A faces is 20. If 5
people arrive at 5:40pm, and patient B sees a doctor at 5:45pm, then the queue is 24,
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the initial 20 patients waiting, minus patient A that left the queue, plus the 5 new
patients.
Equation (3.1) implicitly assumes that an additional patient waiting affects all
other patients in the same way. However, this needs not be true. In fact, it is
natural to conceive that a patient who enters the ED waiting room with a mild cause
will not cause a strong externality to the patient who arrived with a life-threatening
condition, since these two patients are likely to use different resources. To capture
this, we estimate a second class of models with two main independent variable of
interest. First, the queue of patients waiting that have the same level of urgency, as
measured by the Manchester Triage System. Second, the queue of patients that do
not have the same triage color. This allows to disentangle the impact of two different
types of queues on the length of stay.
3.4.2 Identification
Causal interpretation of the effect of arrivals on the outcome variable requires condi-
tional orthogonality between the error term and queue variable. In our case, identifi-
cation may be jeopardized by both demand-side (patients) and supply-side (doctors)
factors.
On the demand side, the fact that patients often bypass gatekeepers to obtain
specialty care in favor of ED visits implies that these visits are not exogenous - at
least for less urgent ones. In particular, the time of the day is highly correlated with
the number of visits, in the sense that patients are more likely to go to the emergency
department in the morning and less at night. To prevent this from confounding our
estimates, we rely on the very finely defined fixed effects at the year-month-day-hour,
which control for selection throughout the day and exploit only variation within a
single hour.5 On the supply side, the cyclicality of treatment throughout the day
5This approach does not control for selection within an hour, which we assume to be minimal.
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reflects on the number of doctors available and hours worked in the ED in a given
hour. Swami et al. (2018) show that the number of hours worked by doctors in
an Australian ED has effects on waiting times. While we do not have information
regarding the number of doctors in the ED at each time, work shifts do not change
within an hour and so this is also controlled for using the hour fixed effects.
Equation (3.1) also suffers from a reverse causality issue caused by doctors’ actions.
Less time spend doing treatment/diagnosis leads to faster discharges from the ED,
which in turn cause a decrease in the number of patients in the waiting room. For
this reason, estimating Equation (3.1) by OLS will underestimate the impact of queue
size on length of stay.
In order to overcome this issue, we focus on an instrumental variable strategy.
We instrument the queue variable with the number of patients who visited the ED in
the 60 minutes prior to a patient’s arrival. For this instrument to be valid, we need
arrival of patients to the ED to affect length of stay only by increasing the queue size.
This argument requires patients’ decision to go to the ED to be independent from
the total visit time. Indeed, there is no formal mechanism for patients to have real
time information about visit times and so they are not likely to be aware and react to
them. 6 It is possible that they have some information that might drive their choices
- such as hour of the day (night vs. day) or day of the week (weekend vs. business
days) - but we control for those through fixed effects and exploit only within-hour
variation in arrivals.
We choose an interval of 60 minutes for the instrument to guarantee a sufficiently
high correlation between the instrument and the dependent variables for the most
power-demanding specification in which we separately analyze the results by triage
color, where observations for some colors are scarce. In Section 3.6 we conduct a
6Since 2016, patients can visit the website http://tempos.min-saude.pt to obtain real-time infor-
mation about waiting times for hospitals ED, but this platform did not exist for years corresponding
to our data span.
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series of robustness checks for instruments that use different time intervals as well as
over-identified models.
3.4.3 Heterogeneity by Episode Degree of Urgency
In the context of limited resources, doctors face a dual challenge. Not only they may
need to change their behavior when faced with higher than expected visits, they also
need to decide which patients to prioritize. A doctor that decides time to spend
with two patients optimally equates the marginal benefit of the two. If these two
patients have different benefit functions, then the doctor allocates resources unevenly.
More importantly, this leads to a differential change in treatment intensity given an
exogenous need for re-optimizing (for example, an increase in the number of arrivals
might change doctors’ opportunity cost of spending time with a given patient). In
particular, doctors who efficiently ration their time would decrease more the time
with the patient if his or her episode is not life threatening.7
We postulate that the color code of the triage system picks up different benefit
functions of treatment for each patient. Therefore, we allow doctors to react differ-
ently to episodes that fall into different levels of triage, s, by running the following
specification.
Length of Stayist = βsQueueit + γXist + τt + εist (3.2)
This model estimates a more demanding specification where we estimate a βs
for each triage color, while Equation (3.1) averages out these effects into a single
coefficient.
7This can be shown using a model in which patients’ utility function is concave.
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3.4.4 Diagnosis and Treatment
In order to analyze doctors’ response regarding diagnosis and treatment procedures,
such as lab tests, exams and drugs administration, we explore the payment scheme
of the Portuguese ED system. We analyze doctors’ behavior in terms of prescription
of treatment at two different levels. First, the extensive margin, which evaluates the
likelihood of a patient being set to further care after seeing a doctor. Second, the
intensive margin, which evaluates the extent to which doctors change the quantity of
treatment, conditional on being sent for additional testing.
In a visit to the ED, patients pay an access charge, which is fixed at a value decided
by the government. A patient that does additional testing faces further payments.
We explore this feature to estimate the extensive margin. We use a linear probability
model to estimate the probability that a given patient is sent for further care after
seeing the doctor, using the same right-hand-side variables as in Equation (3.1). This
approach compares patients who pay the user access charge (e 9.60 in 2011 and e 20
in 2012) versus patients who pay above that value, given changes in queue size.
In order to analyze the intensive margin, we use the fact that in 2012, the OOP
increases for every extra exam, lab test or treatment that the patient undergoes on
her visit. Because of this, costlier procedures are mapped into weakly higher OOP
payments (e.g., procedures that cost between 60 and 64.99 have a user charge of 12
while procedures that cost between 65 and 69.99 have a user charge of 13).8 In 2011,
it is not necessarily the case that costlier procedures map into higher payments, as
the mapping was defined arbitrarily by the government.9 Therefore, we use only 2012
data to analyze the intensive margin. To do so, we estimate a conditional model by
selecting only patients in 2012 that had an OOP over e 20. Using these patients, we
estimate Equation (3.1) where the left-hand-side variable is the value of the OOP,
8The OOP fee schedule is available in Portaria n. 306-A/2011.
9The details are available in Portaria n. 34/2009.
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which measures intensity (the combination of quantity and cost) of the treatment
above the access charge.
3.4.5 Destination Target
The last channel of doctors’ behavior we explore is the destination of the patient
upon discharge. Indeed, the last decision doctors face is where to send patients after
seeing them. This channel may also be influenced by the number of patients arriving
to the ED, in the sense that doctors may cope with a peak in arrivals by sending
them through other channels of health care provision, such as admitting them to the
hospital or referring them to primary health care centers. We evaluate this hypothesis
in two steps. First, we assess the probability of admitting the patient to inpatient care
versus discharging the patient. Second, for patients who were discharged, we compare
the probability of being sent home against the probability of being discharged to be
followed in the primary care services. These three cases account for roughly 80% of
total sample.10 In each case, the independent variable is an indicator for which we
run a linear probability model11 of the same specification as Equation (3.1).
3.4.6 Waiting times
Doctors’ choices of treatment intensity when faced with increases in the queue size
have an effect on the time new patients spend waiting. If doctors decrease length of
stay of patients because of the increasing queue size, then waiting times respond less
than one-to-one to the queue size. This is particularly important because waiting
times have been shown to be correlated with negative outcomes (Sivey (2017)) and
acting to decrease those times mitigates the associated problems.
109% are admitted to inpatient care, 31% are sent to primary care and 39% are discharged home.
We leave out options such as being sent to another hospital (6%), outpatient visit in the same
hospital (9%), leaving without being seen by the doctor or against doctor’s recommendation (6%).
11Non linear models have proven to be unfeasible due to the high dimension of fixed effects.
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We analyze the impact of the queue on waiting times by running regressions of the
same configuration as Equation (3.1), but where the dependent variable is the time
spend waiting for care. Specifically, waiting time is measured as the time between
checking in and being called to see a doctor for the first time. Moreover, the queue
used in this particular regression is measured as the number of people waiting to see
a doctor at the time of check in (as opposed to previous regressions). Therefore, we
measure how the number of people waiting in the emergency room at the time of
check-in affects the amount of time the patient needs to wait to be called for care.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 First stage
We start by showing the strength of our instrument in Table 3.2. In the subsequent
regression analysis, the number of observations is smaller than in Table 3.1 because
we remove from the sample visits in the first 12 hours, as we cannot accurately
calculate the queue for the initial observations in our data. The number of arrivals
in the previous 60 minutes is a good predictor of the queue, defined as the number
of patients waiting to be seen at the time of starting treatment. In fact, the model
predicts that an additional patient arriving to the ED in the past hour increases the
number of patients waiting by 0.136 when including the fixed effects. When focusing
only on episodes that have the same urgency level, the coefficient increases to 0.26,
while an unit increase in different urgency increases the queue by 0.22 (columns 2 and
3). Note also that the cross impact between same and different colors are negative,
albeit with a much smaller coefficient. In order to use arrivals in the previous 60
minutes as an instrument, the sign of the coefficients does not matter as long as there
is predictive power.
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In all three cases, the excluded instruments are statistically significant. The F-
stats for each first-stage regressions are 30.88 for overall visits, 150 for visits of the
same urgency level and 76.5 for visits of different urgency level.
3.5.2 Doctors’ Response to the Queue
The results of estimating Equation (3.1) are reported in Table 3.3, which shows
the impact of the queue on the time spent under treatment. Because the outcome
variable itself includes time waiting for tests and exams after seeing the doctor but
before discharged - which is positively correlated with the queue - we estimate a lower
bound of doctors’ behavior. Nevertheless, we still find a precise negative impact of
the queue on length of stay.
The first and third columns show OLS results, with coefficients that are likely to
be biased due to reverse causality, while columns two and four report the results of
our instrumental variables strategy. Columns 1 and 2 focus on the overall level of
visits, while column 3 and 4 focus on the distinction between the visits with the same
and different urgency levels.
The results for the specification with the overall queue show that an additional
patient waiting to be seen in the ED, when the patient is called to see the doctor,
decreases length of stay by 2.8%. This is a large effect, as for an average length of
stay of 205 minutes, it only takes 5 additional patients to cause a decrease in length
of stay of almost half hour. At the average number of patients waiting (14.6), this
corresponds to an elasticity of length of stay with respect to the queue of -0.41. Note
however, that despite our linear approximation, the queue might have a non linear
impact on the length of stay. Indeed, the marginal effect can be increasing with the
number of patients, in the sense that doctors do not need to ration as much if the
marginal patients arrives when there are only a few patients in the waiting room.
When looking only at the number of patients waiting with the same urgency level, an
97
Table 3.3: Main estimates on the Length of Stay
Dependent variable: Log (LOS)
OLS IV OLS IV
Queue/10 -0.091** -0.286***
(0.036) (0.061)
Same severity queue/10 -0.106** -0.386***
(0.044) (0.058)
Different severity queue/10 -0.077** -0.183**
(0.030) (0.078)
Blue -1.266*** -1.297*** -1.271*** -1.337***
(0.036) (0.032) (0.035) (0.034)
Green -0.876*** -0.886*** -0.857*** -0.756***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.024) (0.031)
Orange 0.657*** 0.652*** 0.646*** 0.577***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.023)
Red -0.368*** -0.368*** -0.379*** -0.445***
(0.092) (0.084) (0.096) (0.089)
Female 0.070*** 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.066***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Age 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female*Age -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the results for the effects of queues on length of stay, mak-
ing a distinction between overall, same urgency and different urgency queues.
Results use a total of 276,061 arrivals in the emergency department of a Lis-
bon hospital, from Jan 2011-Oct 2012. Standard errors are cluster-robust at
the hour level and shown in parenthesis. All models include fixed effects at
the Year-Month-Day-Hour level (15,801 levels). The benchmark triage color
is yellow.
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unit increase decreases length of stay by 3.8%. The coefficient on the tally of patients
that do not have the same degree of urgency is also negative. However, its magnitude
is small compared to the same urgency level. In fact, the model rejects the hypothesis
that these two coefficients are equal. This result suggests that patients with different
magnitudes of arrival urgency do not use the same type of resources and, therefore,
impose a smaller externality than if urgency levels are comparable.
In table Table C.2 in the appendix, we show our results for different choices of fixed
effects using the instrumental variables estimation. In all different specifications, the
coefficients are negative, but much closer to zero than our benchmark. The estimates
show the importance of using the finely detailed fixed effects. For example, the fixed
effects control for the number of doctors working at a given point in time. Not
controlling for this introduces endogeneity in the estimates coming from the positive
correlation between visits and number of doctors working, as more doctors are in the
ED during the day, when the number of visits is higher. If this positive correlation is
not controlled for, our estimates would be biased towards zero.
We now test whether doctors respond by changing intensity of diagnosis and
treatment, both at the extensive and intensive margin. Recall that we use out-
of-pocket as proxy for costs because the institutional setting guarantees a weakly
increasing mapping between costs and patient payments. Because of this, the results
are meaningful only in an ordinal sense.
Table 3.4 shows the results of the instrumental variables estimates on the OOP.
The first two columns show the extensive margin, where the dependent variable takes
the value 1 if a patient had an OOP higher than the access charge, and measures
the probability of a patient taking additional testing. The last two columns measure
the intensive margin. Conditional on being sent for further treatment, the dependent
variable is the value of the OOP, and uses only 2012 data. The first column shows
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that an increase in the queue by 1 individual decreases the likelihood of being sent
for further care by 0.79 percentage points. In our sample, the likelihood of being sent
for further care or diagnosis is 54%, and so an increase in the queue decreases the
likelihood by 1.5%, at mean values. As in the length-of-stay analysis, the patients
that are waiting with the same urgency level have a stronger impact on the likelihood
of further testing than patients waiting with a different urgency level. As far as the
intensive margin is concerned, where we estimate the impact of the queue on the total
OOP, conditional on the OOP being above the access charge, the coefficient on the
overall queue is negative, but imprecise. When disentangling between the queue of
the same and different urgency levels, we still find that the impact is mainly driven
by the queue of patients who have the same urgency, rather than those of different
urgency. Overall, we find evidence that doctor’s decrease the intensity of treatment
when the queue increases, and this is driven mainly by the extensive margin.
Note also that female patients have both lower LOS and OOP, when comparing
to man. Differences in behavior across gender may explain the result. For example,
young males are more likely to end up in the ED injured during sports, while young
females are more likely to resort to emergency care because of anorexia related issues.
If male associated conditions systematically use more resources than female associated
conditions, then it would explain the results.
3.5.3 Heterogeneous Response
We now turn to the estimation of Equation (3.2), in which we explore the hypothesis
that doctors’ respond to congestion differently for patients with different urgency
levels. More specifically, treatment should decrease more for visits with low urgency,
as the potential health effects are smaller than those with serious visits.
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Table 3.4: Main estimates on treatment intensity
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
Dependent variable: 1 if OOP > access charge Log(OOP|OOP > charge)
Queue/10 -0.079*** -0.036
(0.017) (0.024)
Same severity queue/10 -0.100*** -0.055**
(0.016) (0.025)
Different severity queue/10 -0.057*** -0.021
(0.020) (0.025)
Blue -0.478*** -0.486*** -0.191*** -0.198***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Green -0.239*** -0.212*** -0.161*** -0.142***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006)
Orange 0.178*** 0.163*** 0.168*** 0.154***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Red -0.046*** -0.062*** 0.466*** 0.452***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.025) (0.026)
Female -0.009 -0.009 -0.028*** -0.028***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female*Age 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000* -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 276061 276061 73609 73609
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the results for the effects of queues on the intensity of treatment,
making a distinction between overall, same urgency and different urgency queues. The
extensive margin uses 276,061 arrivals from Jan 2011-Oct 2012. The intensive mar-
gin uses 73,609 arrivals from Jan 2012-Oct 2012. Standard errors are cluster-robust at
the hour level and shown in parenthesis. All models include fixed effects at the Year-
Month-Day-Hour level and the queue is instrumented with the number of arrivals in
the past 60 minutes.
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We show in Table 3.5 the estimated coefficient for each triage color, measured as
deviations from visits with an urgency level of Yellow. Columns 1 and 2 show the
impact on the length of stay, columns 3 and 4 the impact on the OOP extensive
margin, and columns 5 and 6 the impact on the OOP intensive margin. An intuitive
illustration of the results is displayed in Figure C·3, that shows the differential impact
of the queue on each triage color.
The point estimates suggest heterogeneity in doctors’ response to overall queues,
12 in that less urgent episodes see their length of stay decrease by more than those
that are more urgent. For example, an increase in the queue by one patient decreases
the length of stay for Yellow-colored episodes by 2.6%, while blue-colored episodes
face a decrease in length of stay of 4.6%. Besides being small in magnitude, the esti-
mated coefficient for “red” cannot be statistically distinguished from zero, suggesting
that increases in congestion do not affect visits that are very life-threatening. Note,
however, that only the “blue”, “green”13 and “red” coefficients are distinguishable
from each other, while we cannot reject the hypothesis that the other coefficients are
different.
Regarding the impact on the out-of-pocket, Table 3.5 shows that the overall neg-
ative impact of the queues on the likelihood of being sent for further care is driven by
the low severity visits, “Blue” and “Green”. The remaining higher severity visits have
a small negative impact, in absolute value, that cannot be statistically distinguished
from each other. As far as the intensive margin is concerned, none of the coefficients
are statistically different from zero, suggesting no effect on this margin.
These results combined suggest that doctors ration their time efficiently, in the
sense that an exogenous shock to ED visits will lead them to decrease more the time
12This section shows the heterogeneous response to the total queue. Results for within-color effects
are in Table C.3
13“Green” is only statistically distinguishable at a 90% confidence level. At 95% confidence level,
as in Figure C·3, only “blue” and “red” are statistically distinguishable.
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with patients whose condition is not life threatening and, therefore, less likely to suffer
from negative health outcomes.
3.5.4 Discharge Destination
In Table 3.6 we run linear probability models on selected discharge destinations. In a
first stage, we evaluate being admitted to inpatient care against being discharged. In
a second stage, we compare being sent home against being discharged to primary care
services. These three possible discharge destinations account for more than 80% of
the total sample. We choose to model the probabilities of each discharge destination
as linear because non-linear models, such as logit and multinomial logit, do not easily
accommodate the high-level fixed effects that our data exploits for identification.14
Results show that an additional arrival to the ED decreases the probability of a
patient being admitted to inpatient care by 0.07 percentage points when compared
to being discharged. This corresponds to a 0.61% decrease in the probability of being
admitted, at the average probability of admission of 11.4%. Conditional on being
discharged, there is no statistical difference between being sent to primary care or
home. An increase in the queue increases the likelihood of being sent to primary care
or home in similar magnitudes. These findings suggest that doctors react to peaks
in arrivals to the ED by sending patients away from hospitals, sending them both to
primary care facilities or their homes.
3.5.5 Waiting Time
Our dataset does not allow us to analyze the impact of doctors’ behavior on patient’s
health outcomes. Nevertheless, multiple studies (summarized in a meta-analysis by
Hoot and Aronsky 2008) show that ED crowding out is correlated with adverse patient
14We have tried both a multinomial logit and poisson estimation with high dimensional fixed
effects, but did not obtain convergence.
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Table 3.6: Discharge destination
Dependent variable: 1 if admitted to 1 if primary care |
inpatient care discharged
OLS IV OLS IV
Queue/10 -0.007*** -0.042*** -0.026 0.019
(0.002) (0.015) (0.019) (0.027)
Blue -0.143*** -0.147*** -0.057*** -0.052***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009)
Green -0.112*** -0.114*** -0.092*** -0.089***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Orange 0.253*** 0.252*** 0.092*** 0.093***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Red 0.407*** 0.407*** -0.210*** -0.211***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.026) (0.026)
Female -0.035*** -0.035*** 0.103*** 0.104***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Age 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female*Age 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 222338 222338 197219 197219
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the results of a LPM on discharge destinations. Re-
sults use data from the emergency department of a Lisbon hospital,
from Jan 2011-Oct 2012. Standard errors are cluster-robust at the
hour level and shown in parenthesis. All models include fixed effects
at the Year-Month-Day-Hour level.
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health outcomes, such as mortality. For this reason, we repeat the analysis using
waiting times as the outcome variable.
Table 3.7 shows the impact of the queue on waiting times. In this table only, the
queue is defined as the number of people waiting at the time of check-in - as opposed
to the time at which a patient is called to see a doctor for the first time. We choose
this specification because when evaluating the impact on waiting times, we want to
make sure we are measuring the queue that happened before the outcome (waiting) is
realized. Using the queue at the time a patient is called in would induce mechanical
correlation between the two variables in this specification.
The first column tells that one extra person waiting in the ED at the time of
check in increases waiting time by 1.67%, on average. At an average queue of 19.4
patients, the estimates point at an elasticity of waiting time with respect to the queue
of 0.32. The second column shows that this effect is only true if the marginal patient
shares the same urgency classification, when the effect is stronger and statistically
distinguishable from zero. The coefficient for the impact of the queue of different
severity is estimated at a value very close to zero. This result together with the ones
of the length of stay analysis indicate that the arrival of an extra patient of different
urgency level does not affect waiting times but may impact their length of stay, after
being called to see a doctor. The last column displays the heterogeneity results, which
show that the positive effect of queues on waiting times is decreasing with the level
of urgency. The result is to be expected since more severe conditions, such as heart
attacks, cannot wait for treatment. In fact, only the two least severe colors, Blue and
Green, present a statistically significant and positive coefficient, while the remaining
three cannot be statistically distinguished from zero.
Overall, we find evidence that queues lead to higher waiting times, but the effect
is very heterogeneous across urgency levels.
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Table 3.7: Waiting time
Dependent variable: Log(Waiting Time)
Queue at check-in/10 0.167*** 0.073
(0.052) (0.045)
Same severity queue at check-in/10 0.360***
(0.066)
Different severity queue at check-in/10 -0.020
(0.041)
Queue at check-in/10 × Blue 0.013*
(0.007)
Queue at check-in/10 × Green 0.017***
(0.004)
Queue at check-in/10 × Orange -0.015***
(0.002)
Queue at check-in/10 × Red -0.015***
(0.005)
Blue 0.962*** 1.122*** 0.712***
(0.069) (0.092) (0.156)
Green 0.470*** 0.199*** 0.136**
(0.027) (0.023) (0.058)
Orange -0.960*** -0.757*** -0.666***
(0.045) (0.047) (0.036)
Red -1.170*** -0.955*** -0.879***
(0.050) (0.052) (0.077)
Female 0.087** 0.084** 0.087***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Age 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female*Age -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the results for the effects of queues on waiting times, using
the number of arrivals in the previous sixty minutes as an instrument. In
this regression queues are measured at the time of check in. The first column
presents the average queue coefficient, while column 2 separates the effects
into equal and different severity queues. The third column shows the hetero-
geneous effects by iterating queue with urgency level, using ’yellow’ as the
benchmark color. Results use a total of 276,061 arrivals in the emergency de-
partment of a Lisbon hospital, from Jan 2011-Oct 2012. Standard errors are
cluster-robust at the hour level and shown in parenthesis. All models include
fixed effects at the Year-Month-Day-Hour level (15,801 levels).
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3.6 Robustness Checks
In this section we run several checks that show the robustness of our estimates, which
can be found in the online appendix, Section C.1. We start by changing our instru-
ment, using only visits with an urgency level ranging from Yellow to Red, because
these are, arguably, the ones that are exogenous to consumer choice (Table C.4). We
also change the time interval of the instrument, by using arrivals in the previous 15,
30 and 90 minutes (Table C.5).
We also separate our regression between day an night effects, as the capacity
constraints might be very different between the two time periods, and find that our
estimates are mostly driven by day-period patients (Table C.6). Finally, we run a
model specification that controls for the age of patients in a flexible manner, given
that age and health status might not be related linearly (Figure C·4).
3.7 Conclusion
Physicians working in hospital Emergency Departments are often faced with demand
hikes. In such circumstances, they need to readily adapt, optimizing the resources
spent with each patient. In practice, this means that whenever the ED is (unpre-
dictably) crowded, doctors may redefine their allocation of resources by decreasing
the amount of tests and time spent with each patient. Accordingly, our results point
towards a lower utilization of both time and diagnosis instruments when the number
of patients is high.
Using an instrumental variable strategy, along with a fixed-effects model, we pro-
vide causal evidence that physicians treat patients less intensively given a demand
hike. The interval between being first seen by the doctor and discharged decreases
when more patients are queuing in the waiting room, as does the likelihood of being
sent to further diagnosis and treatment after seeing the doctor. Moreover, patients are
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more likely to be discharged from the hospital instead of being admitted to inpatient
care.
Rationing both time and lab tests is not bad per se, and whether it has negative
health consequences is an empirical question that depends on the health production
function. Indeed, in the presence of a concave utility function, marginal returns
to health care are decreasing and, if care is sufficiently high, then rationing will
not have serious health effects. We do not test the health outcomes coming from
variation in arrivals, since our data belongs to one hospital. We are not able to follow
the patients in the Portuguese Health Care System, as they can go to a different
hospital (public or private), primary care centers or other services, and we cannot test
for effects on readmissions or other outcomes. Nevertheless, our results do suggest
that health impacts might be a concern for further analysis, as we find evidence
that arrivals are linked to changes in waiting times, known to be correlated with
adverse health outcomes (Hoot and Aronsky 2008). This paper focus, instead, on
studying a mechanism through which ED visits and health outcomes can be linked -
the physicians role - and leaves the assessment of its consequences for future research.
It is encouraging that we find some evidence that physicians ration efficiently, in
the sense that they decrease treatment more intensively for patients without urgent
conditions, whose health impacts are more likely to be small.
Overall, our study has important policy implications. Our results show that doc-
tors react to capacity constraints and, therefore, policies aiming at changing the
amount of resources available to the hospital need to account for doctors’ reaction.
For example, hire additional doctors in order to decrease waiting times might have
a lower than expected impact if the infra-marginal doctors spend more time with
patients as a consequence.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Vertical Integration in
Medicare Part D
A.1 Theoretical framework
Consider a two-stage model where in the first stage insurers, I, negotiate with phar-
macies, H over a dispensing fee, f , that the insurer pays the pharmacy per each unit
of a prescription drug sold to one of the insurer’s enrollees. In the second stage, the
insurer sets premium, p, that each Medicare beneficiary pays to enroll. Each enrollee
will need to buy one unit of a drug (which can represent a bundle of drugs) with
probability φ. In this case, the insurer pays the drug manufacturer an amount d.
Moreover, the enrollee needs to obtain his prescription drug from a pharmacy, and
I assume the prescription is filled at a CVS pharmacy with probability ρ and some
other pharmacy with probability 1− ρ. This probability is conceptually a function of
both the plan characteristics (the plan network) and consumer preferences (distance
to a CVS pharmacy and preferences over different pharmacy brands). In Section 1.4,
I discuss the empirical proxy of this object.
In this framework, the only endogenous variables are the premium, p and the
dispensing fee, f . Essentially, the model keep the standard methodology of endo-
genizing premiums, and further endogeneizes another plan characteristic, the plan
network, that is determined by the value of the dispensing fee. The drug cost, d,
is also an object that is bargained between the insurer and the drug manufacturer,
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but it is considered as exogenous in this model for the sake of simplicity. Due to the
sequential nature of the model, I solve the model by backward induction.
A.1.1 Second stage – Premium decision
In the second stage, insurers set the premiums, given the dispensing fee agreed on
the first stage, constrained by their residual demand curve, Q(p), measured as the
number of enrollees that buy the a plan from the insurer at given vector of market
premiums, p. For simplicity, I focus on a market where insurer sells a single plan
each.
Let insurer j expected (pre-risk adjustment) profit be:
piIj = [pj + sj − cj − φ (ρjfj,cvs + (1− ρj)fj,h + dj)]Qj(p) (A.1)
The new notation in this equation is sj, the per-enrollee subsidy that the insurer
receives from the government (pj + sj is what is called a bid), and cj, which captures
any component of the marginal cost of an enrollee that does not pertain to the dispens-
ing fee. For example, administrative costs related to enrolling an additional Medicare
beneficiary. Altogether, the marginal cost of enrolling a Medicare beneficiary has a
certain component, cj, and an expected component, φ (ρjfj,cvs + (1− ρj)fj,h + dj),
given by i) the probability of an enrollee needing a prescription drug, and ii) the
dispensing fee that insurer j has to pay the pharmacy depending on whether the
enrollee visits a CVS pharmacy, fj,cvs (which happens with probability ρj), or some
other pharmacy h, fj,h.
Medicare Part D runs a risk adjustment program in which subsidies are provided
at the end of the year to compensate insurers for enrolling sicker individuals. This
means that selection incentives for the insurer and adverse selection are not a primary
concern for premium setting - to the extent that risk adjustment works properly - and,
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therefore, premium in Equation (A.1) is defined for the average Medicare beneficiary.
Therefore, I assume φ is common to all plans.
The premium that maximizes Equation (A.1) satisfies the standard result of a
mark-up over marginal cost, where the mark-up is a function of the own-price elas-
ticities:
p∗j =
εj(p
∗)
εj(p∗)− 1 ×
[
cj − sj + φ (ρjfj,cvs + (1− ρj)fj,h + dj)
]
(A.2)
where εj(p
∗) = −∂Qj(p∗)
∂p∗j
p∗j
Qj(p∗)
is the own-price demand elasticity. Note that this
equation only defines premiums implicitly, as premiums show up on both sides.
A.1.2 First stage – Dispensing fee bargaining
In the first stage, a pharmacy and insurer bargain over the dispensing fee, f , that
allows for an insurer to construct its network of pharmacies. If the two parties cannot
reach an agreement over f , then the pharmacy will not belong to the insurer’s network.
The pharmacy’s profit when belong to insurer j’s network is given by
piHh = (fj,h − wh)Qj(p)φρj (A.3)
where wh is the pharmacy’s marginal cost, which includes the wholesale acquisition
cost from purchasing the drug (from the manufacturer or wholesaler). The term
Qj(p)φρj represents the expected demand for the pharmacy coming from insurer j,
which depends not only on premiums but also on the probability of an enrollee getting
sick and filling a prescription at pharmacy h.
The objective function that determines the result of the bargaining depends on
whether the contract is being made with a vertical integrated firm or not. The first
case I present is of vertical separation, which captures the bargaining between, for
example, Walgreens pharmacy and any health insurer (CVS or Humana). The second
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situation captures the incentives that CVS pharmacies have to set different dispensing
fees because they internalize their own insurance profits in the negotiation.
Vertical Separation
The two parties bargain over the dispensing fee to agree on an amount that is benefi-
cial for both. The result of this negotiation leads to two networks. The plan network,
denominated by Ij, is the set of pharmacies where the plan’s enrollees can fill pre-
scriptions. The pharmacy’s network, Ph, is the set of plans which the pharmacy has a
contract with to fill their enrollees’ prescription. The distribution of the fee between
the two parties can be described using the Nash bargaining framework, by defining
the Nash product, Ωj,h, between insurer j and pharmacy h as:
Ωj,h =
[
piIj (p, fj,h, Ij)− piIj (p, Ij \ h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Insurer j’s GFT with pharmacy h
]ω[
piHh (fj,h,Ph)− piHh (Ph \ j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pharmacy h’s GFT with insurer j
]1−ω
(A.4)
Where ω is the exogenous bargaining weight that the insurer has over the phar-
macy and shifts the surplus in their favor, and Ij \ h is the plan’s network without
including pharmacy h, which determines plan j’s disagreement payoffs (analogous for
Ph \ j). GFT stands for gains from trade, the additional value of a party contracting
with another, as defined by Ho and Lee (2017).
The dispensing fee that maximizes the weighted total surplus for both parties is
given by
f ∗j,h = (1− ω)
[
∆Q
p+ s− c− φ(ρf ∗j,−h + d)
(1− ρ)φ
]
+ ω
[
wh − ∆Q
Q
(f ∗−j,h − w)
]
(A.5)
where ∆Q = Qj(I)−Qj(I \h) is the change in demand from including pharmacy
h in network. Equation (A.5) says that the bargained fee between the insurer and
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pharmacy is an weighted average of two terms. The first is the expected benefit for the
insurer to contract with the pharmacy, which depends on how much demand increases
by including the pharmacy in the network, ∆Q and the value of each enrollee. The
second is the expected change in costs for the pharmacy when contracting with the
insurer.
Vertical integration
This case pertains to the negotiation between CVS pharmacy and other insurers to
agree on a dispensing fee. Note that for beneficiaries of a Medicare Part D plan sold
by CVS that fills a prescription in a CVS pharmacy, there is no bargaining between
parties, but CVS acts as a firm that sets a dispensing fee equal to the marginal cost of
the pharmacy wcvs in order to prevent double marginalization and maximize overall
profits for the chain of production.
As far as bargaining between the vertically integrated firm (CVS) and the other
insurer (meaning that j is not CVS in the following equations), CVS takes into
account the profits of both its pharmacy and insurer component in the negotiations.
Therefore, the relevant Nash product that captures the negotiation between these two
parties is:
Ωj,cvs =
[
piIj (p, fj,cvs, Ij)− piIj (p, Ij \ cvs)
]ω
× (A.6)[
piHh (fj,cvs,Ph)− piHh (Ph \ j) + piIcvs (p(fj,cvs))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pharmacy internalizing
impact on insurer
]1−ω
This Equation (A.6) differs from the previous Nash product, Equation (A.4), in
that the gains from trade for the pharmacy have the additional term piIcvs (p(fj,cvs)),
which is the profit of the CVS insurer division. This term is increasing in fj,cvs, since
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an increase in dispensing fees increases premiums (Equation (A.2)) and cross price
elasticities between insurers are positive.
To see how the vertical integration of CVS affects the dispensing fee for other
insurers, consider the simple case where piIcvs (p(fj,cvs)) = αfj,cvs, that is, dispensing
fees increase profits for CVS in a linear way. In this case, the resulting dispensing fee
is:
f ∗j,cvs = (1− ω)
[
∆Q
p+ s− c− φ((1− ρ)f ∗j,−h + d)
ρφ
]
+ ω
[
wcvs − ∆Q
Q
f ∗−j,cvs − wcvs
1 + α
]
(A.7)
The new term in this dispensing fee setting equation is 1 + α, which guarantees
that f ∗j,cvs > f
∗
j,h > wcvs. In words, CVS engages in partial market foreclosure by
charging a dispensing fee to other insurers that is higher than the dispensing fee
that other pharmacies charge. This happens because CVS internalizes the positive
correlation between dispensing fees and their own profits (due to increasing premi-
ums). Moreover, CVS is capable of charging lower premiums because it avoids double
marginalization, by acting as if the dispensing fee agreed between its own insurer and
pharmacy is wcvs.
A.1.3 Estimating market foreclosure
Equation (A.2) provides the basic intuition to estimate market foreclosure using pre-
mium variation. To see this, note how premiums evolve differentially for CVS and
other insurers, as the probability of filling a prescription at a CVS pharmacy changes:
∂p∗j
∂ρ
=
∂µ
∂ρ
MC︸ ︷︷ ︸
Strategic
effect
+φµ
[
∂cj
∂ρ︸︷︷︸
Efficiency
effect
+ fj,cvs − fj,h︸ ︷︷ ︸
Foreclosure
effect
+ ρ
∂fj,cvs
∂ρ
+ (1− ρ)∂fj,h
∂ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bargaining
effect
]
(A.8)
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In Equation (A.8), MC is the marginal cost and µ the mark-up.
The foreclosure effect can be seen in the difference between the dispensing fee
charged by CVS and other firms. In particular, CVS acts as if fcvs,cvs = wcvs –
in order to avoid double marginalization in its production chain – and therefore
fcvs,cvs − fcvs,h < 0. Absent of the other effects, this means that as the probability
of filling a prescription at a CVS pharmacy increases, CVS decreases their premi-
ums, ie, ∂p∗cvs/∂ρ < 0. For other insurers, the foreclosure effect is positive, as CVS
charges higher dispensing fees than other pharmacies, ie, fj,cvs − fj,h > 0, because
they internalize the effect that they have on their own insurance division.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Demand Elasticities by Type
of Service
B.1 Additional tables and figures
Table B.1: Characteristics of individuals in the sample
Concurrent Prospective
Year Obs. Individuals Age Female Risk Score Risk Score
2008 26,530,356 2,210,863 34.15 0.52 1.00 0.99
2009 26,180,802 2,181,734 33.99 0.52 1.11 1.02
2010 30,290,976 2,524,248 34.42 0.52 1.16 1.10
2011 29,583,504 2,465,292 34.01 0.51 1.15 1.09
2012 25,271,124 2,105,927 33.76 0.50 1.14 1.07
2013 15,744,564 1,312,047 34.56 0.51 1.28 1.10
2014 17,361,960 1,446,830 34.07 0.50 1.33 1.07
ALL 170,963,286 14,246,941 34.12 0.51 1.15 1.06
Note: Table summarizes individual characteristics overall and by year in the
study sample. N = 170,963,286 individual months.
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Figure B·1: Plot of intervals of risk scores versus monthly cost shares
for three price measures, all spending, outpatient services, inpatient
services, and pharmacy
Note: Each point in each diagram plots the average cost share for all person-month observa-
tions with a risk score in the 0.1 intervals ranging from .1 to 7.0. Three different cost shares
are plotted: the backward myopic and forward myopic cost shares, which are the individual
level prices, and the average all but one employer cost share for a plan month, which is our
instrument. The figures illustrate that while both backward myopic and forward myopic
prices decline sharply with higher risk scores, employer average costs in a month, which
pool people with diverse risks, show very little decrease across risk scores. N=169,452,390.
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Table B.2: Plan type market shares in the sample
Year HMO POS PPO Comprehensive CDHP HDHP
2008 13.34 14.97 64.46 1.12 5.97 0.13
2009 19.95 9.10 61.94 2.70 5.02 1.29
2010 12.45 9.53 68.78 1.75 6.11 1.38
2011 10.32 15.54 67.59 1.73 4.52 0.30
2012 11.93 18.66 55.96 1.61 11.69 0.15
2013 13.30 3.59 75.70 0.37 2.12 4.92
2014 6.66 4.28 47.75 2.21 31.47 7.63
All 12.79 11.62 63.47 1.69 8.68 1.76
Note: Table shows plan type market shares overall and
by year in the study sample. N = 170,963,286 indi-
vidual months. HMO=Health Maintenance Organization,
POS=Point-of-Service, PPO=Preferred Provider Organization,
CDHP=Consumer-Driven Health Plan, HDHP=High Deductible
Health Plan.
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Table B.3: First stage F-statistics of IV regressions
Backward myopic Forward myopic
cost share cost share
F-statistic F-statistic
All Spending 844.53 1148.97
Outpatient 1895.03 1443.58
Inpatient 283.93 99.31
Pharmaceutical 789.94 1456.37
Maternity 436.3 343.57
MH/SA 571.81 531.55
ER 577.23 206.59
Room and Board 82.35 15.95
Non specialty visits 1109.5 939.05
Home visits 166.73 73.22
Prevention 35.26 32.11
Surgical procedures 35.36 9.03
Surgical supplies/devices 15.38 10.44
Specialty visits 671.16 583.79
Dialysis 50.83 25.1
PT, OT, speech therapy 418.17 434.02
Chiropractic 171.57 202.54
CAT scans 399.74 348.71
Mammograms 14.65 10.17
MRIs 350.88 317.91
PET scans 62.6 38.26
Radiology - diagnostic 600.77 675.64
Ultrasounds 575.52 587.91
Diagnostic services 395.34 443.92
DME 583.39 475.81
Ambulances 128.6 48.18
Note: N = 170,963,286 individual months. Each row is differ-
ent first stage regression using either the backward myopic cost
share or forward myopic cost share as the dependent variable.
Each model includes individual*year fixed effects, 12 monthly
time dummies and uses employers average cost share for that
year*plan*family*month, without the own individual, as an instru-
ment. Cluster corrected standard errors use the employer*plan for
clusters for the F-statistic calculation. The first stage is indepen-
dent of the log transformation applied in the second stage.
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Table B.5: Robustness check using log(spending+1) as the dependent
variable
Backward myopic Forward myopic
cost share cost share
Model: log(1 + Y) Coeff. Elasticity S.E Coeff. Elasticity S.E
All Spending -0.94 -0.33 0.031 -0.94 -0.31 0.029
Outpatient -0.61 -0.21 0.024 -0.64 -0.20 0.023
Inpatient -1.73 -0.24 0.035 -13.75 -1.86 0.280
Pharmaceutical -0.74 -0.33 0.026 -0.83 -0.38 0.030
Maternity -0.20 -0.06 0.031 -0.29 -0.09 0.044
MH/SA -0.42 -0.18 0.031 -0.64 -0.27 0.047
ER -0.09 -0.03 0.017 -0.37 -0.12 0.074
Room and Board -1.09 -0.15 0.053 -6.19 -0.86 0.301
Non specialty visits -0.45 -0.16 0.025 -0.56 -0.17 0.028
Home visits -0.01 0.00 0.050 -0.07 -0.01 0.231
Prevention -0.22 -0.01 0.006 -3.20 -0.19 0.083
Surgical procedures 1.05 0.06 0.077 22.89 1.21 1.672
Surgical supplies/devices -2.48 -0.18 0.070 -64.10 -4.56 1.806
Specialty visits -0.56 -0.22 0.022 -0.77 -0.29 0.029
Dialysis 0.12 0.02 0.123 0.22 0.03 0.228
PT, OT, speech therapy -0.23 -0.10 0.021 -0.41 -0.19 0.038
Chiropractic -0.24 -0.15 0.042 -0.31 -0.19 0.054
CAT scans -0.34 -0.11 0.016 -1.87 -0.57 0.088
Mammograms -0.70 -0.07 0.018 -13.59 -1.34 0.338
MRIs -0.69 -0.21 0.016 -5.33 -1.62 0.125
PET scans -0.86 -0.13 0.061 -5.59 -0.86 0.398
Radiology - diagnostic -0.28 -0.10 0.011 -0.72 -0.25 0.029
Ultrasounds -0.26 -0.09 0.010 -1.04 -0.38 0.041
Diagnostic services -0.35 -0.10 0.013 -1.04 -0.28 0.037
DME -0.27 -0.13 0.025 -0.69 -0.32 0.064
Ambulances -0.22 -0.05 0.039 -3.40 -0.72 0.591
Note: N = 170,963,286 individual months. Each row is a different regression using
the log(spending plus 1) as the dependent variable. Each model includes individ-
ual*year fixed effects, 12 monthly time dummies and uses employers average cost
share for that year*plan*family*month, without the own individual, as an instru-
ment. Cluster corrected standard errors use the employer*plan for clusters. Elas-
ticities are evaluated at the mean cost share for that particular type of service, and
S.E obtained using the delta method.
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Table B.6: Two-part model - Visit binary choice
Backward myopic Forward myopic
cost share cost share
Model: 1(Y >0) Coeff. S.E. Elasticity Coeff. S.E. Elasticity
All Spending -0.13 0.016 -0.10 -0.13 0.0155 -0.09
Outpatient -0.10 0.013 -0.11 -0.11 0.0137 -0.10
Inpatient -0.18 0.029 -5.95 -1.46 0.2289 -47.08
Pharmaceutical -0.10 0.013 -0.13 -0.11 0.0148 -0.15
Maternity -0.03 0.014 -2.34 -0.04 0.0208 -3.37
MH/SA -0.08 0.014 -1.10 -0.12 0.0215 -1.65
ER -0.01 0.008 -0.31 -0.06 0.0346 -1.32
Room and Board -0.14 0.046 -7.49 -0.80 0.2579 -42.33
Non specialty visits -0.11 0.020 -0.23 -0.14 0.0241 -0.25
Home visits -0.02 0.039 -4.27 -0.08 0.1818 -19.62
Prevention -0.05 0.019 -0.08 -0.67 0.2775 -1.14
Surgical procedures 0.11 0.165 8.83 2.41 3.5799 191.81
Surgical supplies/devices -0.26 0.115 -29.30 -6.74 2.9685 -756.51
Specialty visits -0.10 0.011 -0.41 -0.13 0.0151 -0.53
Dialysis 0.02 0.101 8.97 0.04 0.1871 16.65
PT, OT, speech therapy -0.04 0.009 -0.65 -0.08 0.0173 -1.17
Chiropractic -0.05 0.015 -1.30 -0.07 0.0192 -1.68
CAT scans -0.06 0.009 -2.92 -0.31 0.0464 -15.71
Mammograms -0.13 0.034 -1.19 -2.56 0.6601 -22.29
MRIs -0.10 0.008 -5.64 -0.79 0.0614 -42.94
PET scans -0.11 0.053 -72.25 -0.71 0.3445 -469.93
Radiology - diagnostic -0.06 0.007 -0.62 -0.15 0.0179 -1.55
Ultrasounds -0.05 0.005 -1.63 -0.20 0.0221 -6.48
Diagnostic services -0.07 0.011 -0.70 -0.21 0.0332 -1.97
DME -0.05 0.011 -3.34 -0.13 0.0290 -8.62
Ambulances -0.04 0.027 -5.35 -0.54 0.4123 -82.16
Note: N = 170,963,286 individual months. Each row is a different regression using
the 1(spending ¿ 0) as the dependent variable. Each model includes individual*year
fixed effects, 12 monthly time dummies and uses employers average cost share for that
year*plan*family*month, without the own individual, as an instrument. Cluster cor-
rected standard errors use the employer*plan for clusters. Elasticities are evaluated
at the mean cost share and fraction of enrollees with a positive visit for that partic-
ular type of service.
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Table B.7: Two-part model - Conditional spending choice
Backward myopic Forward myopic
cost share cost share
Model: log(Y) Coeff. S.E. Elasticity Coeff. S.E. Elasticity
All Spending -0.42 0.04 -0.14 -0.38 0.03 -0.12
Outpatient -0.12 0.03 -0.04 -0.10 0.03 -0.03
Inpatient -0.12 1.36 -0.01 -0.07 0.83 -0.01
Pharmaceutical -0.53 0.05 -0.22 -0.51 0.05 -0.21
Maternity -0.13 0.13 -0.03 -0.07 0.07 -0.01
MH/SA -0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.02
ER -0.04 0.09 -0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.01
Room and Board 0.16 0.76 0.02 0.12 0.59 0.01
Non specialty visits 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.03
Home visits 0.17 0.17 0.02 0.21 0.21 0.02
Prevention -0.01 0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.00
Surgical procedures -2.03 10.10 -0.10 -4.38 21.79 -0.18
Surgical supplies/devices -3.59 8.87 -0.22 -4.98 12.30 -0.24
Specialty visits -0.13 0.02 -0.05 -0.12 0.01 -0.04
Dialysis -0.12 0.30 -0.01 -0.15 0.39 -0.01
PT, OT, speech therapy 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.01
Chiropractic -0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.01
CAT scans -0.08 0.13 -0.02 -0.07 0.10 -0.01
Mammograms -9.39 17.39 -0.96 -0.09 0.17 -0.01
MRIs 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.00
PET scans -0.19 0.60 -0.02 -0.21 0.67 -0.02
Radiology - diagnostic -0.09 0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.02 -0.01
Ultrasounds 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00
Diagnostic services -0.09 0.06 -0.02 -0.05 0.03 -0.01
DME -0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.00
Ambulances 0.20 0.74 0.04 0.30 1.09 0.05
Note: Each row is a different regression using the log(spending) as the dependent
variable. Each model includes individual*year fixed effects, 12 monthly time dum-
mies and uses employers average cost share for that year*plan*family*month, with-
out the own individual, as an instrument. Cluster corrected standard errors use the
employer*plan for clusters. Elasticities are evaluated at the mean cost share for that
particular type of service.
124
Appendix C
Appendix to Doctors’ Response to
Queues: Evidence from a Portuguese
Emergency Department
C.1 Robustness checks
C.1.1 Exogeneity of Visits to the ED
The institutional context of our setting suggests that, since patients bypass the gate-
keeping process and choose to go to the ED instead, arrivals to the ED might not
be entirely exogenous, at least for those with low level of urgency. The endogeneity
of low-urgency visits has been documented by Sivey (2017), who shows that these
patients are more likely to walk out of the ED without being seen by a doctor. To
protect against this, we test an alternative IV, in a similar fashion to Sivey (2017).
We still use the number of patients that arrived in the previous 60 minutes, but only
those that present levels of urgency ranging from yellow to red. Indeed, by doing this
we remove the two lowest levels of urgency (Blue and Green)1, whose arrivals to the
ED are more likely to be a choice and bias our estimates.
In addition to including only the three most urgent arrivals as the basis for our
instrumental variable, we use them as three separate instruments, rather than their
sum. We choose to estimate this over-identified model in order to conduct over-
1Ideally we would like to exclude yellow as well to have an even stronger robustness test, but the
lack of variation when considering only orange and red and its incapacity to predict the size of the
overall queue harm the strength of the instrument.
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identification tests on the validity of the instruments.
In Table C.4, column (1), the queue coefficient tells that one more patient in the
waiting room causes a decrease in length of stay of 2.7%. The value is similar to the
one obtained in the standard specification, attesting the robustness of the first set of
results. In column (2), the coefficient states that one more person in queue decreases
the out-of-pocket payment by 0.3%. Again, the result is similar to the one in the
standard specification. These results suggest that using all arrivals as the basis for
the instrument does not lead to biased estimates.
Finally, Table C.4 shows, in the last two rows, the Hansen J statistic and cor-
responding p-value of the over-identification test. The p-value of 0.2 and 0.3 points
indicate a low correlation between the different instruments and the predicted resid-
uals, suggesting that our instruments satisfy the exclusion restriction.
C.1.2 Instrument Time Interval
The instrumental variable used in this paper was defined as the number of arrivals
in the previous sixty minutes to the patient’s arrival to the ED. Theoretically, the
exclusion restriction should hold for other time intervals, as long as the episodes that
require emergency care are random, after controlling for hour-specific fixed effects.
The only constraint in selecting the appropriate interval becomes the relevancy of the
instrument in predicting the size of the queue.
We re-estimate Equation (3.1) using different time intervals for the instrument,
corresponding to periods of 15, 30 and 90 minutes and present our results in Table C.5.
As we decrease this time interval, the F-test of the first stage regression increases, and
so do the point estimates for the queue variable. However, the estimated coefficients
are not statistically different from those in the benchmark specification. Even though
the 15 and 30 minutes IVs present higher first-stage F-statistics than the benchmark
model, they do not perform consistently better across all the model specifications used
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in this paper. The strength of these alternative IVs falls below ten when estimating
the model specification of Equation (3.2).
C.1.3 Night and Day
The the results shown in Section 3.5.2 are average effects. Even though the model
relies on hourly fixed effects for identification, it does not look for potential hetero-
geneity within each day. This is particularly important since it is the presence of
capacity constraints that forces doctors to change their behavior. Given that arrivals
to the ED are much higher during the day, it is likely that constraints bind during
this time, which identifies our coefficients.
In this section, we divide the analysis into two different spells, night and day, in
order to understand whether the results are general across the entire day or if they
are being driven by the particularities of one of those periods. We defined night as
the period that goes from 22h00 to 8h00, which is associated with a lower trend in
terms of arrivals to the ED (see Figure 3·4).
The results in Table C.6, in the appendix, show that during day periods, the LOS
coefficient is significant and roughly the same as the one from Section 3.5.2. The
night coefficient is also negative, but higher in absolute values and non statistically
significant. In the out-of-pocket analysis, the coefficients tell a similar story.
These results show that the overall estimates are being driven by day-period pa-
tients. The number of patients during the night period is rather small, and so there
is not enough variation to identify the coefficient with precision.
C.1.4 Age Groups
Age is another potential factor of heterogeneity. In our main specification we included
the variable age in a linear framework, promoting the simplicity of the model and
believing it would be effective enough. In this section we want to provide more depth
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to the analysis of the age variable by dividing it into five years age groups. We
therefore run Equation (3.1) with age substituted by the aforementioned age groups.
The age groups’ coefficients are displayed in Figure C·4, in annex.
Panel A of Figure C·4 shows that LOS increases with the age of the patient, in
what seems a trend close to linear, thus corroborating our first and simpler approach.
Panel B shows a similar pattern regarding out-of-pocket payments. Thus we can say
that both time and use of resources increase with age of the patient.
The queue coefficient, not shown in the figures, is robust to this change, for each
outcomes, showing the same values as in the main approach.
Figure C·1: Length of Stay Distribution
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Note: Length of stay, for each visit, is defined as the time (in
minutes) between a patient is called to see a doctor for the first
time and the time she is discharged by the doctor.
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Figure C·2: Distribution of congestion by triage color of the visit
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Note: Queue is defined as the number of people waiting the emer-
gency department at the time a patient is called to be seen by a
doctor for the first time (start treatment).
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Figure C·3: Triage-specific slopes
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Note: Each figure represents the coefficients of the level of triage inter-
acted with the queue on a regression model that includes Year-Month-
Day-Hour fixed effects and uses the number of visits in the previous 60
minutes as the instrument for the queue. Panel B includes data from
2012 only. Dashed lines at 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure C·4: Age Groups specific slopes
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Note: Each figure represents the coefficients of the age group of the pa-
tient (15 to 20 is the benchmark group) on a regression model that in-
cludes Year-Month-Day-Hour fixed effects and uses the number of visists
in the previous 60 minutes as an instrument for queue size. Panel B
includes data from 2012 only.
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Table C.1: Statistics of Arrivals within a day
Hour Max Hour Min Max/Min Day/Night
Blue 10h 5h 21.06 5.52
Green 10h 5h 11.72 3.83
Yellow 15h 6h 5.88 2.52
Orange 11h 6h 4.23 2.05
Red 19h 7h 6.57 1.58
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The two first columns show the hour of the day where the
maximum and minimum amount of arrivals occur, on aver-
age. The two last columns show the ratio between the max-
imum number of arrivals and the minimum number of ar-
rivals, and the ratio between the number of arrivals during
daytime and the number of arrivals during nighttime.
132
Table C.2: Robustness to different levels of fixed effects
Benchmark No FE Y/M/D Y/M/H Y+M+D+H
Queue/10 -0.286*** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.010 -0.011
(0.061) (0.023) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011)
Blue -1.297*** -1.274*** -1.229*** -1.218*** -1.217***
(0.032) (0.039) (0.030) (0.030) (0.042)
Green -0.886*** -0.877*** -0.858*** -0.852*** -0.852***
(0.013) (0.018) (0.007) (0.007) (0.017)
Orange 0.652*** 0.663*** 0.654*** 0.657*** 0.656***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Red -0.368*** -0.378*** -0.377*** -0.381*** -0.378***
(0.084) (0.090) (0.054) (0.054) (0.089)
Female 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.072*** 0.071***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017)
Age 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female*Age -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the results for the effects of queues on the log of length of
stay. Results use a total of 276,061 arrivals in the emergency department of a
Lisbon hospital, from Jan 2011-Oct 2012. Standard errors are cluster-robust
at the hour level and shown in parenthesis. The benchmark triage color is yel-
low. Column 1 includes fixed effects at the Year-Month-Day-Hour level (15,801
levels). Column 2 has no fixed effect. Column 3 includes fixed effects at the
Year-Month-Day level (670 levels). Column 4 includes fixed effects at the Year-
Month-Hours level (528 levels). Column 5 includes year, month, day and hour
fixed effects, but no interactions.
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Table C.4: Alternative Instrumental Variable
Dependent variable: Log(LOS) Log (OPP)
Queue -0.277*** -0.032
(0.087) (0.028)
Blue -1.296*** -0.255***
(0.034) (0.007)
Green -0.886*** -0.175***
(0.012) (0.004)
Orange 0.652*** 0.225***
(0.012) (0.004)
Red -0.368*** 0.299***
(0.084) (0.022)
Female 0.066*** -0.021***
(0.017) (0.005)
Age 0.015*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000)
Female*Age -0.001** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
First-stage Instrument F-Stat 10.376 13.038
Hansen J-Statistic 3.072 2.041
Chi-sq(2) p-value 0.215 0.360
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the IV results for the effects of queue size
length of stay and out-of-pocket payments. This model uses
previous arrivals of triage color red, orange and yellow as the 3
IVs for queue. In LOS regressions, results use a total of 276,061
arrivals in the emergency department of a Lisbon hospital, from
Jan 2011-Oct 2012. In OOP regressions, results use a total of
127,645 arrivals, from Jan 2012-Oct 2012. Standard errors are
cluster-robust at the hour level and shown in parenthesis. All
models include fixed effects at the Year-Month-Day-Hour level.
The benchmark triage color is yellow.
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Table C.6: Day and Night regressions
Dependent variable: Log(LOS) Log(OOP)
Day Night Day Night
Queue/10 -0.269*** -0.527 -0.033** -0.190
(0.055) (0.381) (0.013) (0.120)
Blue -1.333*** -1.066*** -0.254*** -0.309***
(0.023) (0.232) (0.006) (0.041)
Green -0.897*** -0.860*** -0.178*** -0.179***
(0.014) (0.061) (0.004) (0.018)
Orange 0.647*** 0.691*** 0.226*** 0.236***
(0.012) (0.058) (0.005) (0.024)
Red -0.274*** -0.595*** 0.281*** 0.360***
(0.095) (0.134) (0.027) (0.029)
Female 0.059*** 0.051 -0.020*** -0.039***
(0.019) (0.038) (0.005) (0.009)
Age 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Female*Age -0.001** 0.001 0.000 0.001***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the results for the interactions between queues and
triage colours (Red is the benchmark colour). For the LOS regressions,
results use a total of 276,061 arrivals in the emergency department of
a Lisbon hospital, from Jan 2011-Oct 2012. For the OOP regressions,
results use a total of 127,645 arrivals, from Jan 2012-Oct 2012. Stan-
dard errors are cluster-robust at the hour level and shown in paren-
thesis. All models include fixed effects at the Year-Month-Day-Hour
level. The benchmark triage color is yellow.
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